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2
Introduction
∗
Global trade in services has risen tremendously in recent years. Yet, trade in manufacturing still
accounts for the lion’s share of trade worldwide. However, this picture masks the role of services
value added embodied in manufacturing goods. Disentangling the overall traded manufacturing
value-added on the one hand and services value added on the other hand embodied in destina-
tions’ final demand, Johnson (2014) finds that both account for roughly 40 percent of worldwide
value-added exports. In addition, Johnson and Noguera (2016) show that the ratio of worldwide
value-added exports to gross exports has been declining from 1970 to 2010 for manufacturing,
while it has been increasing for services during the same period.
Another characteristic of global services trade is its high concentrated across countries. Ac-
cording to the World Trade Statistical Review 2017 published by the World Trade Organization,
the top ten traders in commercial services accounted for 53 percent of the world’s total trade
in commercial services in 2016 with the USA, the UK, Germany and China among these top
trading countries. A deepening of preferential trade agreements especially among these large
players is likely to further boost global trade in services.
While there is a bulk of empirical work on the firm-level determinants for goods trade,
research on services trade has only started very recently due to newly available micro-level data.
This thesis tries to shed light on how firms’ individual activities shape aggregate services trade
on the one hand, and – given the recent threat of protectionism among major industrialised
countries – how impediments to firms’ international engagement in services trade may reduce
overall welfare on the other hand. To this end, we use comprehensive information on German
firms’ services trade activities provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank.
The structure is as follows. Chapter 1 presents the cross-sectional distribution of German
firms’ engagement in international services trade and decomposes aggregate services exports and
imports growth into firm-level contributions. Consistent with recent studies for other European
countries, we find a fat-tailed distribution of firms’ activities with respect to trading partners,
∗The views expressed here and in the following chapters are those of the author and do not need to reflect
those of the Deutsche Bundesbank.
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services traded and the number of transactions. While firms trading larger volumes have been
better able to cope with the economic slowdown in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007–
2008, firms exporting smaller volumes grew more dynamically in other periods. This finding
suggests that a reduction in services trade barriers could lay off unexploited growth potentials
as it would enable these dynamically growing firms to serve customers internationally.
Chapter 2 analyses the role of microeconomic shocks to aggregate services trade volatility.
We decompose services trade growth into shocks stemming from the macro-level and a firm-level
component, that captures shocks to firms’ individual trade relationships. We find idiosyncratic
volatility to contribute most to overall services trade volatility. When consolidating shocks to
individual trade relationships within firms, we find overall services trade volatility to decrease
by roughly 40 percent.
Chapter 3 presents a multi-country-multi-sector model of international trade. In the empiri-
cal analysis using transaction- and firm-level data, we estimate the underlying deep parameters
of the model and find considerable heterogeneity in the estimated elasticities across sectors and
destination markets. Using these estimates, we find that overall services trade costs are signif-
icantly reduced by memberships in regional services trade agreements. In our counterfactual
analyses we show that abandoning these services trade agreements for individual member coun-
tries reciprocally results in welfare losses that correspond to a notable share of a year’s real
income growth in many countries, with smaller countries being more affected. In addition, we
find that the removal of existing services trade agreement memberships may have significant
negative spill-over effects to real wages and profits in the manufacturing sector.
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Chapter 1
Variations in Services Trade
∗
1.1 Introduction
International trade in services has become increasingly important in the last decades. Global
services trade relative to world GDP grew from nearly eight percent in 1990 to more than 12
percent in 2012 with a total value of 24 percent relative to world’s goods trade.1 However, these
figures obscure the actual impact of services for overall trade performance. For all EU countries
in 2009, the share of value added of services embodied in gross exports in the manufacturing
sector alone accounted on average for 33 percent, with a share of value added of imported services
in gross exports of 16 percent.2 In Germany, which is according to the World Trade Organization
(2013) among the top three of the largest service exporters and importers worldwide, services
exports only amount to 20 percent of total export revenues. However, when taking their value
added content into account, services make up nearly 50 percent of overall exports, see Deutsche
Bundesbank (2014).3 Hence, when assessing a country’s competitiveness in terms of export
performance it is essential for academics and policy makers not only to focus on goods trade
alone but also take a country’s ability to trade efficient services into account.
In this paper, we analyse the micro-level foundations of services trade, i.e. we ask, how
important firms’ individual behaviour is in shaping variations in aggregate services trade. We
disentangle the potential drivers of variations in services exports and imports along two dimen-
sions: cross-sectional variation and variations over time. To this end, we use comprehensive
firm-level information on services exports and imports at monthly frequency for the years 2001
to 2012 in Germany.
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Elena Biewen (Deutsche Bundesbank). The above disclaimer applies.
1See http://unctadstat.unctad.org (accessed January 2014).
2See the OECD-WTO Trade in Value Added database (TiVA), http://stats.oecd.org (accessed January 2014).
3Jensen (2011) highlights the importance of services trade for the USA.
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We proceed in two steps. First, we present cross-sectional patterns of firms’ trade charac-
teristics.4 Consistent with previous studies, we find that there are significant differences in the
decomposition of trade portfolios between firms with regard to the number of services traded,
the number of trading partners and volume traded with the bulk of cross-border engagement
concentrated on a small number of large firms.
Second, we provide evidence on how firm-level activities shape services trade over time.
While there are many studies in goods trade using yearly data, empirical evidence using higher
frequency data is rarer, see e.g. Bricongne et al. (2012) for an exception. Apart from changes
in trade with established trade relationships, we find that the within-firm reallocation across
trading partners and services significantly contributes to overall services trade growth, see e.g.
Bernard et al. (2009a) for evidence for goods trade. In addition, we find that the gross contri-
bution of firms’ portfolio reshuﬄing significantly increases at monthly frequency. Hence, yearly
data consolidates a lot of firms’ activities in the course of a year.
Since our data also covers the years 2008 to 2009, which are associated with a worldwide
drop in goods trade, we also analyse how firms engaged in services trade adjusted their trade
portfolios in response to a global shock. Consistent with evidence for Belgium, see Ariu (2016a),
we find aggregate services exports and imports to have declined only very moderately with the
intensive margin, i.e. changes in trade flows with established trade relationships, being the
main contributor. In contrast, the extensive margin, i.e. firms’ entry into or exit from export
activities as well as new trade relationships, i.e. new trading partners and newly traded services
among firms already engaged in services trade, alleviated the decline in services exports.
Though adjustment patterns of the average exporter and importer with respect to services
and trading partners are very similar over time, we find significant differences, when it comes
to the performance of firms in different size classes. Given their relatively better diversification,
large services exporting firms were better able to cope with the collapse in goods trade from 2008
to 2009. However, small exporting firms grew most dynamically in all other years. While we
find similar patterns for the years 2008 to 2009, small importing firms grew least dynamically in
all other periods reflecting their low activity in the course of a year compared to small exporting
firms.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 gives a description of our data. Section 1.3
presents key characteristics of the cross-sectional variation between firms. Section 1.4 shows
4Cross-sectional features of firms engaged in services trade have also been documented e.g. by Breinlich and
Criscuolo (2011) for the UK, Federico and Tosti (2012) for Italy and Ariu (2016b) for Belgium. Kelle and Kleinert
(2010), who use information for 2005, were the first to provide empirical characteristics of firms’ services export
and import behaviour in Germany. Since our data are more disaggregated, we extend their analysis by explicitly
accounting for firms’ activity in the course of a year.
6
how firm-level activity shape aggregate variations over time. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Data
We use a unique micro dataset on Statistics on International Trade in Services (SITS) compiled
by the Deutsche Bundesbank. The database covers services transactions between German resi-
dents (non-financial firms, banks, individuals, public authorities) and non-residents and contains
comprehensive information on each reported services transaction for the years 2001 to 2012.5
Each service transaction needs to be reported if the value of incoming or outgoing payments
exceeds 12,500 Euro.6 This reporting requirement has not changed during 2001 to 2012. Given
that reports may also be submitted electronically, many firms also report payments below this
threshold. The reporting threshold has to be applied to the total amount per month, country
and type of service. Hence, one transaction in a given month that we see in the data may
actually comprise several incoming or outgoing payments during that month.
Our data covers three modes of the General Agreement on Trade in Services: Mode 1,
cross-border supply (supplier and customer exchange services without leaving their domestic
country), Mode 2, consumption abroad (customers move to the country of the supplier), and
Mode 4, presence of a natural person (suppliers move to the country of the customer). We
cannot distinguish between the different types of modes, and not any information on trade via
Mode 3, commercial presence abroad, which captures services sales of affiliated firms located
in the country of the customer. However, since we are interested in how firms shape aggregate
services exports and imports as part of the official Balance of Payments Statistics and to be able
to compare our results to findings in the goods trade literature, this is not restrictive.
The data comprise information on the value of each exported or imported transaction, the
individual type of service traded, the destination or source country, and the industry of the
firm.7 Though we do not have any further information on firm characteristics, the data give a
comprehensive picture of the nature of services trade, its composition and differences in trading
patterns and services at the firm-level. Since our focus is on firms’ activities, we exclude private
transfers, and transactions undertaken by international organizations, federal and communal
5The legal basis for collecting the data in order to compile the Balance of Payments Statistics are the Foreign
Payments Act (Section 11(2)), and the Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation (Section 67). The Act on Statistics
for Federal Purposes also applies.
6Payments have to be reported according to the gross settlement principle, i.e. incoming and outgoing flows
must be reported separately, not netted.
7The industry classification is based on Nace Rev. 1.1 (two digits) and reflects firms’ main economic activity.
Firms are legally distinct entities. Even if a legally independent German firm belongs to a holding, it is obliged
to report its service transactions.
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institutions as well as households. In addition, we drop reinsurance services since these flows
are often netted in official statistics and hence, would bias our aggregate series. Our sample
covers more than 75 percent of Germany’s aggregate services trade as reported in the Balance
of Payments Statistics in an average year, more than 200 countries and 73 individual services
which are listed in Table A.1.1.
To get a first impression of the data we use, Figure 1.1 shows the number of German services
exporters and importers as well as the volume of exports and imports in billions of Euro for
the years 2001 to 2012.8 As can be seen in Figure 1.1 the number of importers is remarkably
stable over time with an average of 27,000 firms per year. In contrast, the number of exporters
steadily increases from roughly 6,000 firms in 2001 to more than 13,000 firms in 2012. The
volume of imports and exports grows over the entire time span, with the exception of 2008 to
2009, which coincides with the collapse in goods trade. The volume of imports increases by 67
percent whereas exports increase by nearly 140 percent between 2001 and 2012. Despite the
smaller number of exporting firms, the difference in traded volumes is decreasing for the years
2001 to 2008 and is almost vanishing for the subsequent years. Hence, on average, exporters
trade higher volumes than importing firms.
Figure 1.1: Number of Firms and Trade Volume, 2001-2012
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In goods trade, the industry a firm belongs to (e.g. a manufacturer of motor vehicles) and
8Since services trade exhibits a lot of seasonality at lower frequencies, we focus on yearly figures here.
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the type of good it is shipping (e.g. cars) usually are used interchangeably in the literature.
In services trade, however, this distinction is essential. Figure 1.2 shows the average trade of
selected service categories by individual German industries for the years 2001 to 2012. The
figures for exports and imports are in the top and bottom panel, respectively.9
Figure 1.2 shows that not only pure service industries are engaged in services trade, which
is consistent with the findings of Kelle and Kleinert (2010) and Breinlich and Criscuolo (2011).
In fact, every sector is active in trading all depicted service categories (though to a different
extent) with the manufacturing sector being one of the most important players, both, in terms
of the number of services traded and traded volume.10 While industries like transport or finance
clearly dominate exports and imports of the service category they are associated with, the
manufacturing sector even trades more construction and business services than the construction
and business sectors do, respectively. These figures are very similar for services exports and
imports across industries. Hence, apart from services that support the ongoing business of a
firm (such as back office activities), services do not only enter the value chain as an input in
firms’ production processes (such as R&D or design), they also represent part of firms’ “output”
even if they do not belong to the services industry.11
1.3 Cross-Sectional Variation
In this section we look at the cross-sectional variation of services trade between firms. Table 1.1
shows the extensive and intensive variation of services exports and imports between firms for
the years 2001 to 2012. The extensive variation is given by the number of services, countries,
trade relationships, transactions as well as transactions per trade relationship. Throughout the
paper, we refer to a trade relationship as an observed firm-country-service triplet in a period of
time, which is a year in this case. The intensive variation is captured by firm-level exports per
transaction and per trade relationship, as well as the total amount traded.
The first column shows average characteristics of firms’ trade portfolios for the pooled sample.
The average exporter trades 1.6 services with 5.5 countries. These numbers are very close to
those found by Breinlich and Criscuolo (2011) for the UK, also one of the largest services traders
worldwide, but somewhat larger than those reported by Ariu (2016b) for Belgium. However,
since the average number of trade relationships is only 7.1, exports of firms’ individual services
9The service categories are based on the Extended Balance of Payments Services Classification (EBOPS), see
Table A.1.1.
10Kelle (2012) provides a detailed analysis of German manufacturers engaged in services trade.
11Carry-along trade observed in goods trade, as analysed by Bernard et al. (2012a), is less an issue for services
trade since services are non-storable and have to be consumed immediately after their supply, with trade in rights
being an important exception.
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Figure 1.2: Average Services Trade by Industry, 2001-2012
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Notes: This figure shows the average traded volume in bn. Euro of service categories by industries for the yearly
sample from 2001 to 2012. Each bar represents the a service category which are based on the Extended Balance
of Payments Services Classification (EBOPS) and listed in Table A.1.1. “Manufacturing” and “Construction”
and “IT” denote the respective industries, “Finance” denotes financial intermediaries and insurance companies,
“Wholesale” also includes retail trade, “Transport” also includes storage and the communication industry, and
“Business” includes business activities, real estate, and renting. For expositional reasons, numbers over truncated
bars denote the actual volume traded.
are not evenly spread across countries. For exporting firms, the average number of transactions is
27.4, but they only serve each trade relationship three to four times a year as given by the number
of transactions per trade relationship.12 The finding of infrequent trade is also consistent with
recent evidence for goods trade, see e.g Alessandria et al. (2010) and Kropf and Saure´ (2014),
and Belgian services traders, see Ariu (2016b). Along the lines of Hornok and Koren (2015),
Ariu (2016b) argues that costs per transaction lead firms to trade only infrequently to reduce
costs. There may be two further reasons for this observation. First, services trade often involves
longer-term contracts where the provision of services in the course of a year may be consolidated
in a single payment, e.g. insurance services. Second, some business services may not be due
12 As noted in the previous section, a transaction is a firm-service-country-level trade flow in a given month.
In principle, this volume may comprise several trade flows within that month (which we do not observe). The
number of actual transactions within that month may thus be larger. The maximum number of transactions per
trade relationship that we can observe in a given year is thus bounded above by 12.
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Table 1.1: Heterogeneity Between Firms, Averages for 2001-2012
Percentile intervals based on firm size
Full sample <1 1–25 25–50 50–75 75–99 ≥ 99
Exports
Number of firm-level
services 1.6 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.6 2.4 5.5
countries 5.5 1.2 1.4 2.6 4.7 11.9 41.4
trade relationships 7.1 1.2 1.5 2.8 5.4 15.6 82.3
transactions within a year 27.4 1.3 2.6 7.4 16.8 65.7 464.4
transactions per relationship 3.5 1.1 1.7 3.2 4.2 4.9 5.8
Average firm-level exports per
transaction 277 5 30 75 180 689 3,817
trade relationship 1,193 5 45 200 638 2,985 23,884
Total exports per firm 11,928 5 62 368 1,506 20,053 616,188
Firm-year observations 120,791 830 29,201 30,295 30,209 28,955 1,301
Imports
Number of firm-level
services 2.3 1.0 1.1 1.5 2.2 4.2 10.4
countries 4.5 1.1 1.2 2.1 3.9 9.7 35.8
trade relationships 6.7 1.1 1.3 2.3 4.8 15.3 93.5
transactions within a year 21.1 1.2 1.6 4.3 12.2 50.3 433.9
transactions per relationship 2.3 1.1 1.2 1.9 2.7 3.5 4.8
Average firm-level imports per
transaction 122 2 20 44 76 257 2,468
trade relationship 381 2 23 66 162 876 10,486
Total imports per firm 4,882 2 26 113 465 6,858 300,184
Firm-year observations 323,714 2,552 77,695 81,360 81,097 77,683 3,327
Notes: Trade volumes are rounded and reported in thousand Euro. Transactions denote the number of firm-
service-country trade flows within a given year. A trade relationships is a unique firm-service-country triplet.
Each line shows the average values for the full sample and segments of the firm size distribution, respectively. Size
classes are constructed by ranking firms within each industry by their yearly exports or imports and grouping
into percentile intervals.
every month but have a lower recurrence frequency, e.g. outsourced bookkeeping, such as a
financial statement, or maintenance of machines. In that sense, some services have a “durable”
character.13 These numbers for the extensive margins are also mirrored by the volumes exported
13Kropf and Saure´ (2014) argue that goods exporting firms face a trade-off between costs per shipment and
inventory holding costs. Using information on Swiss firms’ goods exports at the transaction-level, the authors
find that costs per shipment are economically important. However, this trade-off merely applies to firms engaged
in services trade since storage is not an issue by the nature of services.
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with average exports per trade relationship being more than four times larger than exports per
transaction.
In addition to averages across firms, columns two to seven of Table 1.1 also show the distri-
bution of firms’ trade portfolios across size classes.14 Consistent with Breinlich and Criscuolo
(2011) and Ariu (2016b), Table 1.1 reveals large differences in firms’ cross-border engagement.
While on average, firms with an export volume below the first percentile only trade 1.1 services
with 1.2 countries via 1.3 transactions within a year, the top percentile of firms export 5.5 ser-
vices to 41.4 countries via 464.4 transactions. This heterogeneity is even more pronounced in
terms of average export volumes. Firms in the top percentile export roughly 123,000 times more
than firms with export volumes below the first percentile. The finding of a fat-tailed distribu-
tion of firms’ export behaviour along the extensive and the intensive margin is also consistent
with evidence for goods trading firms, see e.g. Bernard et al. (2009c, 2010), and Arkolakis and
Muendler (2013), and firms’ activities more generally, see e.g. Gabaix (2009).
The value of exports for firms with the lowest trading volumes is only 5,000 Euro, which is
below the reporting threshold of 12,500 Euro. Even firms with an export volume between the
first and below the 25th percentile only exhibit export values of 30,000 Euro per transaction.
These relatively small export volumes of a relatively large number of firms are hard to reconcile
with a theoretical model where all firms face the same market access cost that only larger firms
are able to cover as in Melitz (2003). This finding rather suggests that firms endogenously choose
their individual degree of market penetration, as in Arkolakis (2010) and Eaton et al. (2011).
The bottom panel of Table 1.1 shows the characteristics for service sourcing firms. While
the patterns of extensive and intensive variation of cross-border engagement are qualitatively
similar to exporters, we find differences in the magnitude. Consistent with Figure 1.1, total
services imports per firm across all size classes are not even half as large as exports. However,
while the number of trade relationships is by and large the same, importers source more services
from fewer countries and are less active in importing in the course of a year, which suggests that
service importers are relatively more impeded by market-specific rather than service-specific
trade costs.
In order to disentangle the drivers of the variation between firms, we follow Bernard et al.
(2009a) and decompose export or imports of firm f , xf , into the number of country-service
relationships of firm f , of , and the intensive margin of the traded value of firm f per trade
relationship, xf/of . The number of country-service relationships, of , can be further split up
into three extensive components: the number of countries firm f is trading with, cf , the number
14We rank firms within each industry by their yearly exports or imports and group them into size classes. We
use size classes instead of percentiles of the distribution of services, countries, etc. in order to compare the same
set of firms for each item.
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of traded services, sf , and trade density, the number of trade relationships of firm f over all
possible country-service combinations, df = of/ (cfsf ).
We can further extract an additional extensive component from the intensive margin, xf/of ,
by introducing a term which we label activity, given by af = trf/of . Activity measures how
often, as given by the number of transactions, trf , firm f trades with an observed country-
service relationship within a period of time.15 While applied to the cross-section, this measure
has an inherent intertemporal nature as it captures part of firms’ diversification over time. Given
activity, the intensive margin can intuitively be expressed as the volume traded per transaction,
x¯f = xf/trf .
16 Total trade of firm f for a given year t can then be expressed by the following
identity:
xft = cftsftdftaftx¯ft. (1.1)
In order to asses the contribution of the intensive and four extensive margins for the variation
of exports and imports between firms, we regress the logarithm of each margin on the logarithm
of total trade of firm f year t in a pooled OLS using yearly data. As equation (1.1) holds by
definition, the estimated elasticities capture the average percentage contribution to the between-
firm variation of each margin. Table 1.2 reports the relative contribution of each margin for the
full sample, for firms trading volumes below the 25th percentile and the top one percent of
traders.
For the full sample, the intensive margin accounts for nearly 49 and 41 percent of the total
variation across firms for exports and imports, respectively.17 Trading partners and services
account for 30 and 10 percent, respectively, for the variation of exporters, but are somewhat more
important for the variation across importers, with 34 and 21 percent, respectively. Since firms
trading smaller amounts only have one trading partner and trade one service, the contribution of
the country and service margin is smaller compared to the largest firms and the intensive margin
is most important. For firms exporting smaller volumes this is also accompanied by a higher
dispersion of activity, the number of transactions per trade relationship in the course of a year,
which contributes to the cross-sectional variation with 21 percent compared to 18 percent for
15Ariu (2016b) also points to the importance of transactions for explaining the cross-sectional variation in
services trade. He includes the number of transactions as an additional extensive margin directly.
16This decomposition nests the one proposed by Bernard et al. (2009a). In addition, it also avoids a potential
“partial year effect”, a term coined by Bernard et al. (2014) in the context of firm entry dynamics. However, this
effect may also apply to cross-sectional analyses: For two otherwise identical firms that start exporting in different
months, the number of observed transactions may vary and, hence, lead to differences in intensive margins.
17Taking differences in the decompositions into account, these numbers are somewhat larger than those reported
by Ariu (2016b), who finds the intensive margin to contribute only to 35 percent to the cross-sectional variation
of Belgium exporting and importing firms.
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Table 1.2: Between-Firm Margins, 2001-2012
Exports Imports
Margin Full Sample <25 ≥ 99 Full Sample <25 ≥ 99
Countries 0.297 0.140 0.318 0.339 0.082 0.425
(0.003) (0.004) (0.082) (0.002) (0.002) (0.040)
Services 0.097 0.034 0.273 0.210 0.050 0.222
(0.002) (0.002) (0.102) (0.001) (0.001) (0.039)
Density −0.062 −0.017 −0.147 −0.141 −0.031 −0.082
(0.001) (0.001) (0.057) (0.001) (0.001) (0.024)
Activity 0.179 0.209 0.103 0.187 0.069 0.064
(0.001) (0.005) (0.038) (0.001) (0.002) (0.015)
Intensive 0.489 0.636 0.453 0.405 0.830 0.371
(0.003) (0.006) (0.103) (0.002) (0.003) (0.047)
Obs. 120,791 30,031 1,301 323,714 80,247 3,327
Notes: Pooled estimates of the contribution of margins to cross-sectional variation in firm-
level exports and imports for the years 2001 to 2012 for the full sample, for firms trading
volumes below the 25th percentile (“<25”) and for the top percent of traders (“≥ 99”).
Industry-year effects are included. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
the full sample. However, we find the opposite to be true for firms importing smaller volumes,
where the contribution is only 7 percent compared to 19 percent for the full sample. Hence, even
if the difference between the smallest exporters and importers in the number of transactions per
trade relationships is not very pronounced, see Table 1.1, this small contribution reveals that
the average value of 1.2 transactions per trade relationship for firms importing volumes between
the 1st and the 25th percentile varies only very little, implying that small importing firms are
far less active than small exporters.
1.4 Time-Series Variation
In this section we analyse to what extent changes in the observed cross-sectional patterns con-
tribute to the variation of aggregate services trade along the time dimension. To this end, we
proceed in two steps. First, we show how firm entry and exit as well as the reallocation of
resources within incumbent firms contribute to overall services trade growth. Second, we disen-
tangle individual growth rates to assess the relative performance of services, trading partners,
and firms over time. Since our data also cover the years 2008 to 2009, which are associated with
the collapse in goods trade, we can also assess how firms engaged in services trade adjusted their
trade portfolios in response to a global shock.
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1.4.1 Reallocation Over Time
In order to quantify changes over time, we follow the methodology by Davis and Haltiwanger
(1992) and use mid-point growth rates which have become a standard measure of change in
labour economics, and have also been recently applied to goods trade, see e.g. Bricongne et al.
(2012). Compared to conventional growth rates or log-changes, mid-point growth rates have
the advantage to allow for an explicit assessment of the contributions of entering and exiting
firms as well as changes in the distribution of trading partners and services within established
firms’ portfolios to overall growth. An individual mid-point growth rate of a trade flow of firm
f between t and t− 1 is given by the ratio of the total change in trade of service s with country
c to the average traded value of firm f with country c of service s between t and t− 1:
γfcst =
xfcst − xfcst−1
0.5 (xfcst + xfcst−1)
.
The mid-point growth rate of total trade between two periods is the weighted sum of indi-
vidual growth rates:
γt =
∑
fcs
wfcstγfcst ,
where the weights wfcst are given by
wfcst =
xfcst + xfcst−1∑
fcs xfcst +
∑
fcs xfcst−1
. (1.2)
Each individual growth rate at the firm-country-service level can be attributed to one of the
following groups: entering and exiting firms, and incumbents. Changes in trade portfolios of
incumbents can be further decomposed into born and retired relationships with trading partners,
added and dropped services and growing and shrinking growth rates of ongoing country-service
relationships. We thus end up with six extensive and two intensive (gross) margins. This
hierarchy implies a pecking order. Trade with a new country may occur through a new or an
already existing service, i.e. the set of added services only captures service creation among
existing trading partners. The same downward bias of service switching in favor of the country
margin holds for service destruction.
We decompose total services exports and imports for monthly, quarterly and yearly frequen-
cies for the years 2001 to 2012. The results of this decomposition are given in Tables 1.3 and
1.4. To deal with seasonality, quarterly and monthly growth rates are based on year-on-year
changes. The first three columns report the averages of growth rates for the period 2001 to 2008
for the respective frequencies. The subsequent columns show growth rates for individual years
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where monthly and quarterly growth rates are averaged over the respective period. Aggregate
growth rates are reported in the last row.
For the years 2001 to 2008 the average mid-point growth rate of services exports is 10.6
percent with positive net contributions of all margins. At yearly frequency, the most important
contributor is the intensive margin with 6.2 percent. Among the extensive margins, the impact of
net firm entry is highest, followed by trading partners and service switching which may partially
reflect the ordering of margins when calculating mid-point growth rates as noted above. At
quarterly and monthly frequency, we find the net extensive margin to explain more than 58 to
almost 71 percent of overall growth, respectively, with roughly 45 percent of that contribution
being due to within-firm switching among trading partners and services.18
In addition to the impact of net contributions, there are a lot of dynamics when looking
at gross contributions of margins. While the impact is largest for increased and decreased
trade flows among established country-services trade relationships, gross contributions of firm
entry and exit as well as country- and service-switching are far from being negligible. Apart
from reallocation across firms in response to changes in the macroeconomic environment, this
points to the importance of reallocation of incumbent firms’ individual trade portfolios with
regard to trading partners and services, which is consistent with findings for goods trade, e.g.
Bernard et al. (2012b), and recent models of goods trade emphasizing the endogenous selection of
products and trading partners within firms, e.g. Eckel and Neary (2010), Bernard et al. (2011),
and Arkolakis and Muendler (2015).19 We find significant differences in the gross contribution of
firms’ activities across frequencies. While the contribution of born and retired trading partners at
yearly frequency is 3.5 and -2.3 percent, respectively, their gross contribution amounts to 11.2 and
-9.1 percent at monthly frequency, respectively, which is consistent with findings of Bricongne
et al. (2012) for French goods exporters. Table 1.3 shows that the increase in gross contributions
at higher frequencies also holds for entries and exits of firms and service switching and for all
years. Hence, the consolidation of individual transactions at lower frequencies cushions the
relatively higher gross contributions to growth within a period and thus conceals firms’ actual
activity in the course of a year.
During the global recession of the years 2008 to 2009 world trade collapsed by almost 30
18These findings are larger than those reported by Bricongne et al. (2012) for goods exports in France. For the
years 2000 to 2007 the authors find the net extensive margin to contribute to 52 and 57 percent at yearly and
monthly frequency, respectively.
19Bernard et al. (2009b) find product-country switching to account for 25 percent of average export growth for
the years 1993 to 2003 (excluding the years around the recession in the USA 2000 to 2002). At yearly frequency
we find service-country switching to contribute to 19 percent to overall service export growth. However, given
that we only observe 73 individual services compared to the ten-digit Harmonized System classification observed
by Bernard et al. (2009b), this number is likely to be downward biased.
17
percent while trade in services remained remarkably stable during that period, see Eaton et al.
(2015) and Borchert and Mattoo (2010). Table 1.3 shows that also German services exports only
moderately declined by not even 3 percent. Possible reasons are that demand for services is less
cyclical and their provision is less finance-dependent compared to goods trade, see Borchert and
Mattoo (2010) and Ariu (2016a) for a discussion. As can be seen in Table 1.3, this decline can
exclusively be ascribed to the intensive margin. That the intensive margin is the main driver
during the trade collapse is consistent with findings by Bricongne et al. (2012) and Behrens et al.
(2013) for goods trade and Ariu (2016a) for Belgium services trade. Table 1.3 shows that the
contribution of shrinking exports exceeds (in absolute terms) the still considerable growth in
increasing export sales (-28.0 and 20.8 percent at monthly frequency, respectively). In contrast,
the net contributions of all extensive margins are positive and even alleviated the decline in
services exports. Gross contributions of added and dropped services increase compared to the
years 2001 to 2008 indicating an active reshuﬄing of firms’ portfolio along the service dimension.
For the years following the goods trade collapse, aggregate export growth is positive with
all margins contributing positively (with minor exceptions). The intensive margin is the main
driver for the recovery in 2009 to 2010 with a growth rate of roughly 6 percent which may also
reflect a catching-up effect after the downturn. For aggregate services exports, we cannot deduce
any significant effect of the Eurozone debt crisis on services exports for the years 2009 onwards.
If anything, there is a reduction in the contribution of service-switching for the periods 2009 to
2010 and 2010 to 2011 compared to previous years.
Table 1.4 presents the results for services imports. We find similar patterns to that of services
exports for the years 2001 to 2008. However, firm exit, retired trading partners and dropped
services are quantitatively more important than for exports with net firm entry contributing
negatively or very little to growth in all subsequent years. Services imports fell by roughly 5
percent from 2008 to 2009 with the main driver again being the intensive margin. In addition to a
positive net contribution, the gross margin of added services also increases, while the contribution
of dropped services decreases (in absolute terms), pointing again to an active rebalancing of firms’
trade portfolios in terms of services.
1.4.2 Reallocation Across Services, Trading Partners, and Firms
To gain further insights into the adjustment across firms, we next analyse the performance of
firms in different size classes. We do so by controlling for developments in markets and services
traded, which allows an assessment of how services and countries are affected by the average
firm’s portfolio adjustment.
For expositional reasons, we cluster services according to the EBOPS classification given
18
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in Table A.1.1 in the Appendix. By the same token, we cluster each country into one of six
exclusive groups: countries belonging to the European Monetary Union, countries belonging to
the Eurozone, countries that suffered most during the government debt crisis in the Eurozone,
i.e. Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain, denoted GIIPS, the USA as Germany’s most
important trading partner, and Brazil, Russia, India, and China, abbreviated BRIC, to analyze
the impact of these strong expanding emerging economies. All other countries are denoted as
rest the of the world, RoW. To capture different size classes, we rank firms of each industry
by their total weight, i.e. the sum of their traded volume in t − 1 and t relative to the sum of
aggregate trade volume in t− 1 and t, as given in equation (1.2) and build quantiles.
We regress individual mid-point growth rates on a set of service category, country group,
as well as size class dummies to disentangle the performance of each, as in Bricongne et al.
(2012).20 We apply a restricted weighted least squares regression. Given a proper formulation
of the restrictions, the constrained model facilitates a meaningful interpretation of the estimated
effects of each set as deviations from the weighted average of all service, country, and size class
effects, respectively, and can be regarded as a measure of relative performance. We thus estimate
the following equation for each period t:
γfcst = αt + δst + δct + δqt + εfcst s.t.∑
n
wntδnt = 0 n ∈ {s, c, q} , (1.3)
where αt is a constant and δst, δct, and δqt denote service categories, country groups, and quantile
dummies in period t, respectively. Equation (1.3) restricts the weighted sum of dummies to be
equal to zero, where wnt with n ∈ {s, c, q} denotes the weight of a service, country, or size class
in total exports or imports in period t, i.e. wnt =
∑
fsc∈nwfsct.
21
Figure 1.3, Figure 1.4, and Figure 1.5 summarize the results for the yearly sample for service
categories, country groups and size classes, respectively. Each group of bars represents the
estimated contribution for the respective period. The first and third group of bars represent
simple averages of estimated effects over 2001 to 2008 and 2009 to 2012, respectively, while
the second group shows estimates for the years 2008 to 2009. Results for exports and imports
20Given that our dependent variable has two mass points around -2 and 2 the predicted values may exceed
these values. One way to overcome this issue would be to estimate a fully saturated model, i.e. to include all
possible interaction terms among the set of dummy variables, see e.g. Angrist and Pischke (2009). However, we
abstract from this issue in the following.
21Since we saw in Section 3.2 that virtually all industries are engaged in services trade, including an industry
effect would only be natural. However, since there are some industries that concentrate on trading a specific
group of services, e.g. the transport industry, such an industry effect would pick up the respective service effect
to some extent and vice versa.
20
Figure 1.3: Relative Performance and Absolute Contribution: Service Categories
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Notes: Services belonging to each categories are based on the Extended Balance of Payments Services Classification
(EBOPS) and listed in Table A.1.1. Each group of bars represents the estimated contribution for the respective
period. Bars for the years 2001 to 2008 and 2009 to 2012 are simple averages of estimated effects. Numbers
over truncated bars denote the actual value of the estimated effects. Mid-point growth of each service category is
depicted by a black solid circle.
are given in the top and bottom panels, respectively. In addition to this relative performance
measure, we also add the absolute contribution to services trade growth for each period depicted
by a black circle.
For the years 2001 to 2008 on average, none of the service categories show significant differ-
ences in export performance relative to the average as shown in Figure 1.3. While the absolute
contribution to service export growth is largest for the years 2001 to 2008, transport services
are hit most during the great recession given their complementarity to goods trade. However,
they contribute positively to growth from 2009 to 2010 mirroring the recovery of international
goods trade. Construction services show a lower relative performance in all years after 2008.
This may in some part be explained by bursts of real estate bubbles as e.g. in the USA, Spain
or Ireland.
Financial and insurance services did not suffer relative to the average as they have performed
better for exports and not significantly different than the average for imports. For Belgium, Ariu
21
(2016a) even finds that exports of financial and insurance services have grown by more than 20
percent. This might reflect an increase in the demand for debt and trade credit insurance in
times of higher global uncertainty.
Other business services contribute positively to service export growth and performed rela-
tively better during 2008 to 2009. This is in line with the hypotheses that on the one hand,
firms outsourced backoffice services to lower costs during the trade crisis and, on the other
hand, business services usually are tailored to the customers’ needs and, hence, part of long-
term customer-supplier relationships resulting in less cyclical demand, see Borchert and Mattoo
(2010).
Exports and imports of royalties, which also include patents, licenses and other rights,
strongly outperformed trade in other service categories and show the largest absolute contri-
bution to growth during the trade collapse. Since the value of licences and other rights are
usually bargained bilaterally between customer and supplier, there is no market price for these
services. Hence, trade with royalties are ideally suited for transfer pricing and to shift profits
between affiliated firms abroad. While there is evidence that multinational enterprises locate
patents at affiliates that face lower taxes to decrease the overall corporate tax burden, see e.g.
Karkinsky and Riedel (2012), Figure 1.3 shows that the outperformance of royalties holds for
imports as well as for exports. This might suggest that in times of financial distress, liquidity is
shifted abroad to cope with financial shortages.
We find the adjustment patterns of the average exporter and importer with regard to service
categories to be very similar during the trade collapse and the subsequent years. Figure 1.4
reveals that this similarity also holds along the country dimension.
For the years 2001 to 2008 more mature markets like the USA and the EMU contribute
to a large extent to aggregate service export and import growth, which is consistent with the
findings of Bernard et al. (2009c) who document that most trade of US exporting and importing
firms is conducted with higher income countries. However, trade with these countries grows less
dynamically than with less saturated markets like the EU (non-EMU), which mainly consists
of the new EU member states, and the emerging BRIC countries. Exports to these countries
continue to grow more dynamically during 2008 to 2009 while the USA is most harmed as a
trading partner both, for exports and imports reflecting the high uncertainty after the burst of
the housing bubble and the following financial crisis. For imports, firms seem to concentrate
more on neighboring countries, as the EMU and EU perform better than the average during
that time, though absolute growth is also negative. This picture changes during the outbreak
of the government debt crisis in the Eurozone, where all European countries show an underper-
formance. The USA, the rest of the world and especially the BRIC countries contribute more
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Figure 1.4: Relative Performance and Absolute Contribution: Country Groups
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Notes: “GIIPS” denotes Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, “BRIC” denotes Brazil, Russia, India, and
China, and “RoW” denotes the rest of the world, i.e. countries not part of any other group. Each group of bars
represents the estimated contribution for the respective period. Bars for the years 2001 to 2008 and 2009 to 2012
are simple averages of estimated effects. Mid-point growth of each country group is depicted by a black solid
circle.
than average. Trade with Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain grows least dynamically in
subsequent years. But since Figure 1.4 shows a similar pattern also for the years 2001 to 2008,
this underperformance does not appear to be specific to the crisis.
Figure 1.5 presents the results for different size classes. While Section 1.3 showed that firms in
the top percentile of the distribution clearly dominate aggregate services trade in terms of traded
volume, Figure 1.5 shows for the years 2001 to 2008 for exports that they also contribute more
to aggregate trade growth than firms trading only smaller volumes. However, smaller exporting
firms exhibit higher growth dynamics compared to the largest firms which underperformed
relative to the average firm, which is consistent with Eaton et al. (2007) and Arkolakis (2016),
who also find higher growth dynamics for small goods exporters conditional upon survival.
Hence, even though firms in lower quantiles often only have small sales of one service with
one trading partner, they are an important contributor to export growth. However, firms with
trading volumes above the 99th percentile of the distribution nevertheless have been better able
to manage the trade collapse. This picture reverses with regard to relative growth dynamics for
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Figure 1.5: Relative Performance and Absolute Contribution: Size Classes
0.
14
−
.
1
−
.
05
0
.
05
.
1
Ex
po
rts
2001−2008 2008−2009 2009−2012
−
.
1
−
.
05
0
.
05
.
1
Im
po
rts
2001−2008 2008−2009 2009−2012
<Q0.25 Q0.25−Q0.5 Q0.5−Q0.75
Q0.75−Q0.90 Q0.90−Q0.99 ≥Q0.99
Notes: Size classes are formed according to the sum of firms’ traded volume in t− 1 and t relative to the sum of
aggregate trade volume in t− 1 and t for each industry. Qx denotes the x-quantile. Each group of bars represents
the estimated contribution for the respective period. Bars for the years 2001 to 2008 and 2009 to 2012 are simple
averages of estimated effects. Numbers over truncated bars denote the actual value of the estimated effects.
Mid-point growth of each size class is depicted by a black solid circle.
the years 2009 to 2012, where we find qualitatively similar patterns compared to the years 2001
to 2008.
While we also find that small importing firms suffered most and the largest importing firms
perform relatively better during the trade collapse, we see a complete different picture compared
to exports when looking at the years 2001 to 2008 and 2009 to 2012. Though the absolute
contributions to growth of the largest and smallest firms are similar to exporting firms for the
period 2001 to 2008, the top-percentile of importing firms performs relatively better, while
smaller firms underperform. This lower relative performance is even more pronounced for the
years 2009-2012. This is consistent with the relatively low activity of small importing firms
compared to small exporting firms in the course of a year as shown in Section 1.3 as well as a
relatively small net contribution of firm entry to growth that is even negative for the years 2008
onwards as shown in Table 1.4.
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1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyse how firm-level patterns shape variations in aggregate services trade in
the cross-section and over time. Firms’ reallocation across trading partners and services signifi-
cantly contributes to overall services trade growth with the gross contribution of the reallocation
within firms being larger at higher frequencies. Small exporting firms grew most dynamically
with the only exception being the years 2008 to 2009 where firms trading larger volumes were
better able to manage the trade collapse given their relatively better diversification. In contrast,
small importing firms grew least dynamically in all years as they are relatively less active in the
course of a year compared to small exporting firms. Still, these findings suggest that removing
impediments to cross-border services trade, such as a deepening of the EU Single Market for
Services, might help to exploit untapped growth potentials since that would alleviate foreign
market entry for small, but dynamically growing firms.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
Table A.1.1: Service Categories
Services
Transport
Receipts from freight transport by land between third counties (80)
Receipts from rail freight between third countries (80)
Receipts from inland waterway transport between third countries (80)
Receipts from sea freight between third countries (81)
Receipts from air freight between third countries (82)
Expenditure on sea freight in connection with German imports (210)
Expenditure on sea freight in connection with German exports (220)
Receipts and expenditure of resident airlines for air freight services in connection with Germanys external
trade (225)
Receipts for providing pipelines/transmission through pipelines for transport through Germany (without
withdrawals) (215)
Receipts from and expenditure on inland freight water transport including towage charges and the cost of
pushing barges in connection with Germanys external trade (216)
Receipts from and expenditure on the transmission of electricity (217)
Receipts from and expenditure on the bilateral movement of rail freight (233)
Receipts of resident rail companies from transit (234)
Expenditure on freight transport by land in connection with Germanys external trade (240)
Payments to non-resident transport enterprises for air freight in connection with Germanys external trade
(244)
Receipts and expenditure on transport by pipeline in connection with Germanys external trade (226)
Expenditure on freight transport by land between third countries (260)
Expenditure on rail freight between third countries (260)
Expenditure on inland waterway transport between third countries (260)
Expenditure on sea freight between third countries (260)
Expenditure on air freight between third countries (260)
Receipts from and expenditure on air freight within Germany (270)
Receipts from and expenditure on freight transport by land within Germany (271)
Receipts from and expenditure on rail freight within Germany (271)
Receipts from and expenditure on inland waterway transport within the economic territory (271)
Receipts from and payments by resident rail companies for the cross-border transport of passengers and for
carrying passengers between third countries (13)
Receipts from and expenditure of resident airlines for the cross-border transport of passengers and for
carrying passengers between third countries (14)
Receipts from the cross-border transport of passengers from carrying passengers between third-party coun-
tries by resident road transport companies (e.g. coach holidays) (15)
Receipts from cross-border passenger transportation and from inland waterway transport between third
countries (15)
Payments to non-resident airlines for the cross-border transport of passengers and for carrying passengers
between third countries (15)
Expenditure on the cross-border transport of passengers and on carrying passengers between third-party
countries (e.g. coach holidays) (16)
Payments to non-resident rail companies for the cross-border transport of persons and for carrying passengers
between third countries (16)
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Services
Expenditure on cross-border passenger transportation and on inland waterway transport between third
countries (16)
Expenditure on cross-border passenger transport and on sea transport between third-party countries (16)
Expenditure on the transport of passengers by non-resident airlines within the economic territory (20)
Receipts from seaports and firms operating there (300)
Expenditure on ancillary transport services in shipping (310)
Expenditure on ancillary transport services provided by road haulage companies (except fuel and other
vehicle supplies) (320)
Payments by inland waterway enterprises for ancillary transport services (except for fuel and other ship
supplies) (320)
Expenditure on ancillary transport services by other resident enterprises (330)
Receipts from ancillary transport services provided within Germany for non-resident rail operators (340)
Payments by resident rail companies for ancillary transport services provided by non-residents abroad (340)
Receipts from ancillary transport services in air transport (360)
Expenditure of resident airlines e.g. for take-off, landing and overflying charges as well as air traffic control
(360)
Expenditure of resident airlines on the purchase of goods such as fuels, on-board catering and on-board sales
(361)
Expenditure on road haulage companies for fuel and other vehicle supplies (362)
Receipts from supplying goods to meet the needs of foreign land craft equipment (e.g. fuel) (362)
Payments by inland waterway enterprises for fuel and other ship supplies (362)
Receipts from supplying goods to meet the need of foreign inland waterway ships (e.g. fuel) (362)
Receipts from freight transport by land and other forms of transport (that cannot be assigned to any other
item or cannot be divided up) as well as receipts arising from refunds of freight advances in connection with
Germanys external trade (370)
Travel (17)
Communication services, postal services
Communications services (518)
Postal and courier services (591)
Construction services
Construction sites in Germany payments made to non-resident firms in the economic territory (excluding
payment for imports of goods) (570)
Construction sites in Germany receipts from goods deliveries to non-resident firms in the economic territory
commissioned by residents (580)
Construction sites abroad expenditure of resident firms on construction work abroad commissioned by
non-residents (580)
Construction sites abroad receipts from construction work abroad commissioned by non-residents (excluding
export proceeds) (570)
Financial and insurance services
Financial services (533)
Resident policy holders
Expenditure on premiums/receipts arising from claims
Life insurance (400)
Secondary life insurance market (401)
Transport insurance for German imports and exports (410)
Other insurance transactions (420)
Resident insurance corporations, direct insurance contracts with non-residents
Premium receipts / expenditure arising from claims
Life insurance (440)
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Services
Transport insurance for German imports and exports (441)
Other insurance transactions (442)
Direct insurance contracts with residents
Expenditure arising from claims
Life insurance (443)
Transport insurance (imports and exports) (444)
Other insurance transactions (445)
Other receipts from recoveries etc. (460)
IT services (513)
Royalties and license fees
Patents, licences, inventions, processes (technical know-how) (502)
Other rights (e.g. trade marks, franchise fees, marketing rights and rights to use a name) (503)
Emission rights (e.g. EU allowances, assigned amount units) (507)
Other business services (without merchanting)
Research and development (511)
Engineering and other technical services as well as architects fees (512)
Commercial, organisational and administrative services (516)
Payments for other entrepreneurial work (519)
Advertising and trade fair expenses (540)
Disposal services (534)
Commission fees (523)
Subsidies to subsidiaries, branches and operating plants (530)
Overhead expenses (531)
Repairs to means of transport (560)
Repairs to buildings and other immovables (561)
Repairs to goods imported and exported for the purpose of repair (562)
Other services (595)
Personnel, cultural, recreational services
Artistic copyrights (501)
Film and television industry (510)
Other firm-related services not allocated elsewhere
Freelance work (514)
Personnel leasing (517)
Compensation of employees (521)
Rents/operational leasing (594)
Note: The service categories (in bold) are based on the Extended Balance of Payments Services Classification
(EBOPS). Numbers in brackets correspond to the coding list of the Deutsche Bundesbank.
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Chapter 2
Volatility in Services Trade
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we ask what role individual firms play in driving aggregate variations in services
trade. We contribute to the recent literature that studies the role of microeconomic shocks for
generating aggregate fluctuations. Gabaix (2011) finds that idiosyncratic shocks to firms do not
vanish in the aggregate if the firm-size distribution is fat-tailed but can lead to considerable
macroeconomic fluctuations. Carvalho (2010) and Acemoglu et al. (2012) show that microeco-
nomic shocks may propagate through the economy via input-output linkages and contribute to
aggregate volatility. Our paper also adds to the recent work by Kramarz et al. (2015) who also
point to the importance of firms’ diversification for aggregate volatility.1
Our analysis of the drivers of services trade volatility is closely related to di Giovanni et al.
(2014) who use yearly data of French firms’ sales at home and abroad. We follow the authors by
decomposing services trade growth into shocks at the aggregate level, a macro-meso component,
and an idiosyncratic component that captures shocks stemming from firms’ individual trade
relationships.
We show that, at yearly frequency, idiosyncratic shocks stemming from firms’ trade relation-
ships are relatively more important for explaining overall services trade volatility than macro-
meso-level shocks, though their impact is still sizable, which is consistent with the findings of
di Giovanni et al. (2014). However, we find differences across frequencies. While the relative
contribution of the macro-meso component is increasing at monthly frequency, suggesting that
it is more driven by temporary shocks, such as demand shocks that are more important in the
1Kramarz et al. (2015) focus on yearly information on French firms’ individual trade networks. While Kramarz
et al. (2015) have very disaggregated information on firms’ sales vis-a`-vis individual buyers, we use information
that is more disaggregated along the time dimension.
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short run, the absolute and relative contribution of the idiosyncratic component is decreasing
at higher frequencies. Since transactions are lumpy within firms and firms’ trade portfolios are
also intertemporally imperfectly diversified, as noted above, idiosyncratic volatility increases
from monthly to yearly frequency.
At yearly frequency, we find that shocks stemming from the extensive margin to only play a
minor role in explaining aggregate services trade volatility compared to shocks stemming from
the intensive margin. Though the impact of the intensive margin is still larger, the relative
contribution of the extensive margin increases at monthly frequency given the increase in gross
contributions of entering and exiting firms as well the reallocation of resources across trade
relationships within established firms to overall services trade growth at higher frequencies.
Given their importance for aggregate volatility, we decompose fluctuations stemming from
idiosyncratic shocks into a direct component, i.e. shocks to firms’ individual trade relationships
alone, and network effects that arise from input-output linkages leading to comovement between
firms. Consistent with di Giovanni et al. (2014), we find that at yearly frequency network
effects explain the lion share of idiosyncratic volatility and closely resemble the evolution of
idiosyncratic volatility over time. However, at monthly frequency, the relative contribution of
the direct effect more than doubles while the impact of network effects, though still being larger,
decreases. Hence, we find that the direct component and network effects are not separated
channels, but instead mutually belong together, as recently argued by Gabaix (2016). In the
short run, shocks to firms’ individual trade relationships alone matter. In the course of a year,
comovement between firms becomes more important indicating that these individual shocks are
propagated through firm-to-firm linkages which increase the impact of network effects at yearly
frequency.
Finally, we also add to the literature by showing that the diversification within firms matters
for aggregate fluctuations. We consolidate shocks stemming from individual trade relationships
within firms leaving as only source of variation shocks to individual firms’ total trade. When
taking firms’ diversification explicitly into account, we find overall and idiosyncratic volatility to
be roughly 40 percent smaller compared to the corresponding undiversified volatilities at yearly
frequency, while the relative contribution of idiosyncratic shocks is by and large the same.
This complements recent findings by Kramarz et al. (2015), who use a different decomposition
methodology than we do but find that shocks to seller-buyer relationships are important for
overall volatility. Since idiosyncratic volatility now increases only very modestly from monthly
to yearly frequency, the consolidation of shocks within firms diversifies most of the lumpiness of
firms’ transactions intertemporally.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 briefly describes our data. Section 2.3 shows
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firms’ trade portfolio allocation in terms of traded services partner countries and transactions.
Section 2.4 shows how the dispersion of activities within firms lead to aggregate variations in
services trade volatility. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Data
We use the Statistics on International Trade in Services (SITS) compiled by the Deutsche
Bundesbank which provides comprehensive information on Germany’s trade in services at the
transaction-level, covering the universe of German services exporters and importers. Incoming or
outgoing payments of services trade flows that exceed 12,500 Euro (or the equivalent in another
currency) need to be reported with type of services traded and destination or source country.
However, the data also entails traded volumes below this reporting threshold. One additional
virtue of the data is its availability at monthly frequency. We use the SITS for the years 2001
to 2012. A detailed description is given in Chapter 1.
2.3 Within-firm Distribution of Traded Services, Destinations
and Transactions
In this section, we look at firms’ trade portfolios in greater detail. Tables 2.1 to 2.3 show the
distribution of services, trading partners and transactions within firms. The tables present the
shares of volumes traded of an average firm attributable to the first, second, third, etc. most im-
portant service, market, and transaction, respectively. The last two columns show the ordinary
and the normalised Herfindahl indeces of within-firm shares as measures of diversification. While
the ordinary Herfindahl index gives the overall diversification due to the extensive and intensive
margin, the normalised Herfindahl index reflects diversification along the intensive margin only,
taken as given the number of services, countries or transactions.2
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show that there is a strong concentration on “core” services and trading
partners. A firm that exports two services allocates more than 80 percent of its sales to the
most important one. The average share is decreasing for firms exporting more services, but still
amounts to 60 percent if exactly ten services are exported. The average share of sales of the
second, third etc. most important service is exponentially decreasing, with an average share of
only 0.1 percent on the tenth service exported. A similar concentration also holds among trading
2 The ordinary Herfindahl index is given by HI =
∑
n (xfn/xf )
2 and ranges from 1/Nn to 1 for n ∈ {s, c, tr},
where Nn is the number of services, countries or transactions. The normalised Herfindahl index is given by
HInorm = (HI − 1/Nn)/(1− 1/Nn) for n ∈ {s, c, tr} and ranges from 0 to 1, with HInorm = 1 for Nn = 1.
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Table 2.1: Heterogeneity Within Firms, Services Traded, Averages for 2001-2012
Rank of service Trade Within-firm
1 2 3 4 5 10 volume HI HInorm
Percent of exports
Exact 2 services 81.37 18.63 − − − − 11,264 0.74 0.49
Exact 3 services 74.22 19.44 6.34 − − − 20,223 0.65 0.47
Exact 4 services 69.98 19.88 7.37 2.77 − − 25,244 0.59 0.46
Exact 5 services 67.73 20.22 7.70 3.15 1.20 − 36,003 0.56 0.45
Exact 10 services 59.90 20.76 9.06 4.52 2.48 0.13 170,953 0.46 0.40
Percent of imports
Exact 2 services 77.80 22.20 − − − − 2,655 0.70 0.40
Exact 3 services 70.06 21.46 8.48 − − − 4,042 0.60 0.40
Exact 4 services 65.71 21.10 9.08 4.12 − − 5,284 0.54 0.39
Exact 5 services 62.45 21.08 9.53 4.67 2.27 − 6,549 0.50 0.38
Exact 10 services 54.21 20.44 10.53 5.92 3.61 0.27 22,512 0.40 0.34
Notes: This table shows the average within-firm shares (in percent) of exports/imports for those
services ranked first, second, third, etc. and firms that trade exactly two, three, four, etc. services.
Average trade volumes are rounded and reported in thousand Euro. HI and HInorm denote the
usual and normalised within-firm Herfindahl index, respectively (see footnote 2).
partners. These figures are remarkably similar to those found by Breinlich and Criscuolo (2011)
for the UK.3
Clearly, the ordinary Herfindahl index, and hence, the concentration of firms’ portfolios, is
decreasing in the number of services exported and trading partners. Controlling for the number
of services exported and the number of trading partners, the normalised Herfindahl reveals that
better diversification of larger firms is not only due to the higher number of services traded and
countries served per se, but also due to the allocation of trade volumes within firms’ portfolios.
Still, firms that export to 25 countries have an ordinary Herfindahl of 0.2 while an even split of
their respective export activity across destination countries would imply a value of 0.04.
Table 2.3 shows quantitatively very similar distributions of within-firm shares of export
transactions with almost identical Herfindahl indeces compared to the diversification among
trading partners. In addition to yearly averages, Table A.2.1 in the Appendix presents the
within-firm distribution of transactions for an average month. We find almost identical patterns.
If they do become active in a month, they do not split their sales equally, but concentrate on
most important transactions. Thus, the lumpiness documented in Alessandria et al. (2010) for
disaggregated exported goods in the USA, also holds within firms. Despite their low activity,
3This finding is also in line with recent evidence by Kramarz et al. (2015). Using data on French firms’ trade
networks, they show that the concentration of goods sales also holds among clients of individual firms.
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Table 2.2: Heterogeneity Within Firms, Trading Partners, Averages for 2001-2012
Rank of country Trade Within-firm
1 2 3 4 5 10 25 volume HI HInorm
Percent of exports
Exact 2 countries 77.81 22.19 − − − − − 2,481 0.70 0.41
Exact 3 countries 68.25 22.48 9.27 − − − − 3,624 0.58 0.37
Exact 4 countries 62.15 22.45 10.27 5.12 − − − 4,007 0.51 0.34
Exact 5 countries 58.44 21.64 10.75 5.93 3.25 − − 4,896 0.46 0.32
Exact 10 countries 46.47 19.48 11.37 7.44 5.13 0.84 − 11,024 0.33 0.25
Exact 25 countries 33.85 16.08 10.27 7.54 5.81 2.14 0.11 64,858 0.20 0.17
Percent of imports
Exact 2 countries 75.47 24.53 − − − − − 737 0.67 0.35
Exact 3 countries 66.21 23.36 10.43 − − − − 1,075 0.55 0.33
Exact 4 countries 60.73 22.61 10.96 5.69 − − − 1,492 0.49 0.31
Exact 5 countries 56.63 22.11 11.33 6.36 3.56 − − 1,970 0.44 0.30
Exact 10 countries 45.96 20.16 11.64 7.52 5.07 0.77 − 6,167 0.32 0.24
Exact 25 countries 35.40 16.16 10.55 7.47 5.77 2.01 0.09 29,656 0.21 0.18
Notes: This table shows the average shares (in percent) of exports and imports for those trading partners
ranked first, second, third, etc. and firms that trade with exactly two, three, four, etc. countries. Average
trade volumes are rounded and reported in thousand Euro. HI andHInorm denote the usual and normalised
within-firm Herfindahl index, respectively (see footnote 2).
one still might expect that firms improve the diversification of their trade portfolios in the course
of a year. However, compared to Table 2.3, the Herfindahl indeces are even slightly smaller at
monthly frequency. Hence, firms are not only imperfectly diversified in a given month but also
intertemporally as their trading activity is infrequent.
Results for importing firms with the same number of services, countries and transactions
as exporters are by and large the same. If anything, despite trading lower volumes, they are
slightly better diversified than exporters.
2.4 Volatility in Services Trade
In this section we analyse, how fluctuations in service trade growth themselves are driven by
changes in firm-level activities. To this end, we proceed in four steps. First, we decompose service
trade growth into shocks at the aggregate- and firm-level following the recent contribution by di
Giovanni et al. (2014). Second, we analyse the contribution of the extensive and intensive margin
to overall service trade volatility, taking advantage of mid-point growth rates as our measure
for change, see Davis and Haltiwanger (1992). Third, we disentangle the sources of fluctuations
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Table 2.3: Heterogeneity Within Firms, Transactions, Averages for 2001-2012
Rank of transaction Trade Within-firm
1 2 3 4 5 10 25 volume HI HInorm
Percent of exports
Exact 2 transactions 76.89 23.11 − − − − − 2,307 0.69 0.39
Exact 3 transactions 67.55 22.82 9.64 − − − − 3,275 0.57 0.36
Exact 4 transactions 61.31 22.73 10.62 5.35 − − − 3,894 0.49 0.33
Exact 5 transactions 57.10 22.26 11.11 6.13 3.39 − − 3,926 0.44 0.31
Exact 10 transactions 45.50 19.44 11.56 7.65 5.26 0.91 − 8,976 0.32 0.24
Exact 25 transactions 33.11 16.03 10.45 7.56 5.82 2.13 0.14 27,734 0.20 0.16
Percent of imports
Exact 2 transactions 73.55 26.45 − − − − − 1,200 0.65 0.31
Exact 3 transactions 64.11 24.20 11.69 − − − − 969 0.53 0.30
Exact 4 transactions 58.43 23.10 11.87 6.60 − − − 1,116 0.46 0.28
Exact 5 transactions 54.72 22.17 11.88 7.01 4.22 − − 1,347 0.42 0.27
Exact 10 transactions 44.39 19.88 11.72 7.63 5.30 1.04 − 3,203 0.30 0.23
Exact 25 transactions 34.13 16.06 10.53 7.54 5.76 2.02 0.16 14,776 0.20 0.17
Notes: This table shows the average shares (in percent) of exports and imports for those transactions ranked
first, second, third, etc. and firms that engage exactly two, three, four, etc. times in service-country trade in
a given year. Average trade volumes are rounded and reported in thousand Euro. HI and HInorm denote
the usual and normalised within-firm Herfindahl index, respectively (see footnote 2).
stemming from idiosyncratic shocks by decomposing idiosyncratic volatility into shocks specific
to individual firms’ trade relationships alone and comovement across firms. Finally, we asses
the role played by the diversification among trade relationships within firms for the variation of
growth rates.
2.4.1 Shocks at the Macro-Meso- and Firm-Level
Setting up a model along the lines of Melitz (2003) and Eaton et al. (2011), di Giovanni et al.
(2014) decompose aggregate sales volatility of French firms into an aggregate and a firm-specific
component. The individual mid-point growth rate of sales xfcst of firm f that is trading service
s with country c at time t can be decomposed as:
γfsct = αt + δct + δit + δsct + εfsct , (2.1)
with γfcst = 2 (xfcst − xfcst−1) / (xfcst + xfcst−1). Equation (2.1) decomposes individual growth
rates of exports and imports into two effects that reflect shocks at the macro- and meso-level,
respectively, as well as shocks stemming from firms’ individual trade relationships. The macro-
level is given by a time effect, αt, that captures a domestic aggregate shock common to all
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firms (a Germany-specific shock) and a shock specific to the country German firms are trading
with, δct. The meso-level comprises an industry-specific shock, δit, and a service-country-specific
shock that is supposed to capture demand shocks for individual services in one country, δsct. The
idiosyncratic component captures shocks to firms’ individual trade relationships and is given by
the residual, εfsct. The decomposition in di Giovanni et al. (2014) is based on log-differences
which cannot be applied to mid-point growth rates. Hence, our results should be seen as an
approximation to their model.
As noted in the previous section, the coefficients in the above regression cannot be identified
separately if estimated in one framework unless some effects are dropped or other restrictions are
imposed. Variations of the estimated coefficients would then have to be interpreted relative to
the omitted base effect. We follow di Giovanni et al. (2014) and subsume time, country, demand,
and industry effects into one set of dummy variables, δscit, that captures all effects at the macro-
and meso-level and enables us to disentangle macro-meso- from idiosyncratic shocks.4 The joint
impact of the effects remains the same regardless of the identification strategy. We thus run the
following regression:
γfsct = δscit + εfsct .
Weighting the individual components with their respective weights and summation leads to
aggregate trade growth in period t:
γt =
∑
fsc
wfsct (δscit + εfsct) =
∑
sci
wscitδscit +
∑
fsc
wfsctεfsct (2.2)
with wfcst = (xfcst + xfcst−1) /
(∑
fcs xfcst +
∑
fcs xfcst−1
)
. A natural way to asses the impact
of shocks at the macro-meso- and firm-level on service trade volatility would be to decompose
the variance based on equation (2.2) into the sum of the variances of the weighted components
and the covariance between them:
Var (γt) = Var
(∑
sci
wscitδscit
)
+Var
∑
fsc
wfsctεfsct
+Cov
∑
sci
wscitδscit,
∑
fsc
wfsctεfsct

However, decomposing the variance in this way makes it infeasible to analyze the contribution of
shocks at the macro-meso- and firm-level alone, since the above decomposition links the contribu-
tion of shocks with the attached weights. To get a better understanding about how macro-meso
4As shown in the previous chapter, it is important to distinguish a firm’s industry from the services it is
trading. Hence, we slightly augment the framework by di Giovanni et al. (2014) to account for potential industry
shocks. Even though the sector of a firm may coincide with the services it is trading, e.g. in the case of transport
services, this is innocuous as we subsume all effects at the macro-meso level anyway.
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and idiosyncratic components influence fluctuations in aggregate service trade growth, we treat
the weights as non-stochastic and keep them constant at each point in time, as in Carvalho and
Gabaix (2013) and di Giovanni et al. (2014). Aggregate service trade growth at time t with
weights being fixed at their time τ value can then be written as:
γt|τ =
∑
sci
wsciτδscit +
∑
fsc
wfscτεfsct .
We thus end up with T × T growth rates, where T is the total number of periods. The variance
can then be decomposed as
σ2γτ = σ
2
δτ + σ
2
ετ +Covτ , with (2.3)
σ2δτ = Var
(∑
sci
wsciτδscit
)
,
σ2ετ = Var
∑
fsc
wfscτεfsct
 , and
Covτ = Cov
∑
sci
wsciτδscit,
∑
fsc
wfscτεfsct
 .
The left hand side of equation (2.3), σ2γτ , corresponds to the variance of actual mid-point growth
rates. Variances of macro-meso- and firm-level shocks are denoted by σ2δτ and σ
2
ετ , respectively.
The last term on the right hand of equation (2.3), Covτ , is the covariance between the two
levels.5
Table 2.4 presents the results of this decomposition for monthly, quarterly and yearly fre-
quencies. The first column of each block of frequencies presents averages of the standard de-
viations over the sample. The second column presents averages of standard deviations relative
to aggregate volatility. Results for exports and imports are given in the top and bottom panel,
respectively.
As can be seen from Table 2.4, idiosyncratic shocks stemming from firms’ export relationships
are relatively more important for explaining actual service trade volatility than macro-meso-
level shocks, though their impact is still sizable. At yearly frequency, the relative standard
deviations of idiosyncratic shocks and the macro-meso-level are 0.86 and 0.46, respectively. These
findings are quantitatively remarkably similar to those of di Giovanni et al. (2014) for French
goods exporters.6 However, Table 2.4 also shows that there are differences across frequencies.
5σ2γτ , σ
2
δτ and σ
2
ετ can be seen as the variance of T realizations of γt|τ ,
∑
sci wscitδscit, and
∑
fsc wfsctεfsct,
respectively. di Giovanni et al. (2014) technically show how σ2γτ relates to aggregate growth volatility.
6Since the decomposition in di Giovanni et al. (2014) is based on log-changes, it captures changes in established
trade relationships of incumbent firms only. They use mid-point growth rates as a robustness check and find the
relative standard deviation of idiosyncratic shocks to be of similar magnitude for all French firms in their sample.
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Table 2.4: Contribution to Service Trade Volatility: Macro-Meso and Idiosyncratic Shocks
monthly quarterly yearly
SD Rel. SD SD Rel. SD SD Rel. SD
services exports
Actual 0.1384 1.0000 0.1588 1.0000 0.1985 1.0000
Macro-Meso 0.0919 0.7031 0.0828 0.5615 0.0812 0.4561
Idiosyncratic 0.1128 0.8059 0.1366 0.8489 0.1730 0.8569
services imports
Actual 0.1282 1.0000 0.1560 1.0000 0.2061 1.0000
Macro-Meso 0.0912 0.7474 0.0838 0.5721 0.0863 0.4578
Idiosyncratic 0.1107 0.8681 0.1378 0.8902 0.1828 0.8936
Notes: This table shows the contribution of macro-meso and idiosyncratic shocks to
actual services trade volatility for monthly, quarterly and yearly frequencies according
to the decomposition in equation (2.3). The first column of each block of frequencies
presents averages of the standard deviations over the sample (i.e. 1/T
∑
σnτ for
n ∈ {γ, δ, ε}). The second column presents averages of standard deviations relative
to aggregate volatility (i.e. 1/T
∑
σnτ/σγτ for n ∈ {γ, δ, ε}). Results for exports
and imports are given in the top and bottom panel, respectively.
Though the absolute standard deviation of shocks at the macro-meso-level stays by and large
the same across frequencies, their relative impact increases by more than 60 percent to 0.70 at
monthly frequency. This indicates that, on average, the macro-meso component is more driven
by temporary shocks, such as demand shocks, that are more important at shorter horizons.
In contrast, the absolute and relative idiosyncratic volatility decreases at higher frequencies.
There are two opposing effects driving this result. On the one hand, idiosyncratic volatility
should increase in the very short run, since the gross contribution of firms’ portfolio reallocation
to growth increases at monthly frequency, as shown in the previous chapter. On the other hand,
if firms do become active during a year, their sales are concentrated on most important trans-
actions, as shown in Section 2.3. In addition, given that firms trade is infrequent in the course
of a year, idiosyncratic volatility should increase from monthly to yearly frequency. Table 2.4
shows that this latter effect dominates.
Table 2.4 shows quantitative similar results for the absolute and relative contribution of
shocks stemming from the macro-meso-level and firms’ individual trade relationships for imports.
The evolution of volatilities for the quarterly sample is depicted in Figure 2.1.7 Estimates
for services exports and imports are given in the left and right panel, respectively. Shaded areas
correspond to the 95 percent confidence interval based on an overlapping block bootstrap.8 The
7We stick to quarterly frequency here to be more in line with standard business cycle analysis.
8di Giovanni et al. (2014) show that results based on analytical and bootstrapped standard errors are very
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Figure 2.1: Contribution of Macro-Meso and Idiosyncratic Shocks to Quarterly Service Trade
Volatility
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Notes: This figure shows the estimated contribution of shocks to the macro-meso- and firm-level according to equation (2.3).
Estimates for services exports and imports are given in the left and right panel, respectively. Shaded areas correspond to
the 95 percent confidence interval based on overlapping block bootstraps.
volatility of idiosyncratic shocks to firms’ trade relationships closely resembles the behaviour of
actual service trade volatility, whereas the volatility of shocks at the macro-meso-level remains
almost constant over the sample period, which again is very similar to the findings of di Giovanni
et al. (2014) for yearly French firms’ sales.
There is no pronounced effect of the Great Recession or the Eurozone sovereign debt crises
in either series. Figure 2.2 shows the relative contribution of shocks at the macro-meso-level
and idiosyncratic shocks to firms’ trade relationships to actual service trade volatility over time.
Results for exports and imports are in the top and bottom panel, respectively. We would expect
shocks at the macro-meso-level to become more important for aggregate fluctuations during the
crisis period after 2007 due to increased policy interventions. Figure 2.2 reveals, that there is
an increase in the relative importance of macro-meso-level shocks since 2007. While the relative
standard deviation of the idiosyncratic component is decreasing after 2005 for exports and 2006
similar. The bootstrap is based on the series of γt|τ ,
∑
wsciτδscit and
∑
wfscτεfsct. We draw 10,000 overlapping
blocks with replacement from each series. The blocksize is determined by the nearest integer to T 1/3, i.e. 4 for
quarterly frequency.
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Figure 2.2: Relative Contribution of Macro-Meso and Idiosyncratic Shocks
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Notes: This figure shows the volatility of shocks at the macro-meso-level shocks and idiosyncratic shocks relative to actual
services trade volatility given by σδτ/σγτ and σετ/σγτ for quarterly data. The series for services exports and imports are
given in the top and bottom panel, respectively.
for imports, it again increases for the years 2008 to 2010. Hence, even though actual and firm-
specific volatility are decreasing in absolute terms after 2007, firm-level adjustments during and
in the aftermath of the trade collapse in 2008 to 2009 increased its relative contribution during
that time.
2.4.2 Extensive and Intensive Margin
As the previous chapter showed that entering and exiting firms as well as service- and country-
switching within incumbent firms contribute to a considerable part to aggregate service trade
growth, we further analyse their impact for service trade volatility. Since our underlying measure
of change is based on mid-point growth rates, we can disentangle the impact of the extensive
and intensive margin on the fluctuations of service trade based on individual growth rates. More
specifically, we decompose the actual variance into the variation of growth due to changes in the
extensive and intensive margin, respectively, as well as a covariance term between the two:
σ2γτ = Var
 ∑
fsc∈E
wfscτγfsct
+Var
∑
fsc∈I
wfscτγfsct
+Covτ ,
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Table 2.5: Contribution to Service Trade Volatility: Extensive and Intensive Margin
monthly quarterly yearly
SD Rel. SD SD Rel. SD SD Rel. SD
services exports
Actual 0.1384 1.0000 0.1588 1.0000 0.1985 1.0000
Extensive Margin 0.0241 0.1767 0.0185 0.1190 0.0138 0.0722
Intensive Margin 0.0584 0.4345 0.0726 0.4667 0.1116 0.5732
services imports
Actual 0.1282 1.0000 0.1560 1.0000 0.2061 1.0000
Extensive Margin 0.0212 0.1686 0.0178 0.1140 0.0137 0.0651
Intensive Margin 0.0535 0.4268 0.0730 0.4770 0.1138 0.5591
Notes: This table shows actual volatility for the full sample, as well as for sub-
samples of growth rates belonging to extensive and intensive margin, respectively,
for monthly, quarterly and yearly frequencies. The first column of each block of
frequencies presents averages of the standard deviations over the sample. The second
column presents averages of standard deviations relative to actual volatility for the
full sample. Results for exports and imports are given in the top and bottom panel,
respectively.
where E and I denote the set of individual growth rates belonging to the extensive and intensive
margin, respectively.
Table 2.5 shows the resulting standard deviation of actual service trade and the extensive
and intensive margin as well as the respective standard deviation relative to actual service trade
volatility. The evolution of volatilities is depicted in Figure 2.3. As can be seen, the intensive
margin is more important for actual service trade volatility. At yearly frequency, the intensive
margin explains more than 55 percent, whereas the extensive margin only explains 7 percent
of actual service export and import volatility, respectively.9 However, the relative standard
deviation of growth rates due to changes in the extensive margin increases at higher frequencies
and the impact of the intensive margin decreases. While the contribution of the intensive margin
is still larger with 0.43, the relative standard deviation of the extensive margin more than doubles
to 0.18 and 0.17 at monthly frequency for exports and imports, respectively, which is consistent
with increasing gross contributions of the reallocation of resources across trading partners and
services within established firms to growth at higher frequencies as shown in the the previous
chapter.
We find quantitatively very similar results when we decompose idiosyncratic shocks to firms’
9Decomposing aggregate sales growth of French firms, di Giovanni et al. (2014) also find the intensive margin
to be more important than the extensive margin, but report somewhat larger numbers.
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Figure 2.3: Contribution of the Extensive and Intensive Margin
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Notes: This figure shows the contribution of the extensive and intensive margin for actual services trade for quarterly data.
Series for services exports and imports are given on the top and bottom panel, respectively.
trade relationships into extensive and intensive components, see Table A.2.2.10 The intensive
margin contributes most to idiosyncratic volatility with the extensive margin becoming more
important at higher frequencies.
2.4.3 Idiosyncratic Shocks and Network Effects
Given the importance of shocks to firms’ trade relationships for aggregate volatility as shown
in Section 2.4.1, we further analyse two potential channels through which idiosyncratic shocks
may matter for the aggregate. Gabaix (2011) shows that, if the firm size distribution is fat-
tailed, idiosyncratic shocks to large firms may lead to considerable aggregate fluctuations.11
10In this case, firm-specific volatility can be decomposed as:
σ2ετ = Var
 ∑
fsc∈E
wfscτεfsct
+Var
 ∑
fsc∈I
wfscτεfsct
+Cov
 ∑
fsc∈E
wfscτεfsct,
∑
fsc∈I
wfscτεfsct
 .
11Gabaix (2011) shows that if the firm size distribution is thin-tailed and the Central Limit Theorem applies,
shocks to individual firms decay very fast at a rate 1/
√
Nf , where Nf is the number of firms. If, in contrast, firm
size is distributed according to a power law, shocks decay much more slowly, e.g. at rate 1/lnNf in case of a Zipf
distribution, giving rise for idiosyncratic shocks of large firms to matter for aggregate fluctuations.
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For the USA, he finds idiosyncratic shocks to the 100 largest firms to account for roughly one
third of overall GDP volatility. Canals et al. (2007) and di Giovanni and Levchenko (2012) also
provide evidence for the role of idiosyncratic shocks to large firms in open economy settings.
Another reason why micro-level shocks may matter for aggregate fluctuations is that firms do
not act as isolated entities but are embedded in complex production networks. The argument is
similar to the one above: If input-output linkages between firms are not balanced but fat-tailed
distributed, i.e. some few firms play a dominant role in supplying inputs to others, firm-specific
idiosyncratic shocks may propagate through the network leading to aggregate fluctuations as
shown by Acemoglu et al. (2012) and Carvalho (2014). Since the volume of firms’ individual
trade flows and the number of trade relationships are fat-tailed distributed, both arguments may
matter for explaining overall idiosyncratic volatility.
In order to assess the contribution of both channels, we follow Carvalho and Gabaix (2013)
and di Giovanni et al. (2014) and decompose the volatility of shocks to firms’ trade relationships
as:
σ2ετ =
∑
fsc
w2fscτVar (εfsct) +
∑
fsc
∑
f ′ ̸=f
s′ ̸=s
c′ ̸=c
wfscτwf ′s′c′τCov
(
εfsct, εf ′s′c′t
)
= Direct2τ + Link
2
τ (2.4)
The first term on the right hand side, Direct2τ , is the weighted sum of individual variances
of shocks to firms’ trade relationships, and captures the impact of shocks to individual trade
relationships alone. The second term on the right hand side of equation (2.4), Link2τ , is the
weighted sum of covariances of shocks to trade relationships and captures the comovement
across firms.
The resulting decomposition is summarized in Table 2.6 and graphically depicted in Fig-
ure 2.4. For monthly, quarterly and yearly frequencies, the first column in Table 2.6 shows the
average standard deviation of the firm-specific idiosyncratic component, the Direct component,
and the volatility due to comovement, the Link component. The second and third column re-
port the average standard deviation of each component relative to total idiosyncratic as well as
actual volatility, respectively.
At yearly frequency, Table 2.6 shows that linkages between firms almost exclusively explain
idiosyncratic volatility. Volatility due to comovement between firms amounts to 98 percent
relative to total idiosyncratic volatility for both, exports and imports, and 84 and 88 percent
relative to actual volatility for exports and imports, respectively. This is true for all years:
the top panel of Figure 2.4 shows that the series of total idiosyncratic volatility and volatility
due to firm-to-firm linkages, Link, are virtually identical. In contrast, at yearly frequency, the
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Figure 2.4: Contribution of Idiosyncratic Shocks and Network Effects
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Notes: This figure shows the contribution of volatilities of shocks to individual trade relationships (Direct) and the contri-
bution of covariances between firms (Link) for total firm-specific idiosyncratic volatility, σετ , based on the decomposition in
equation (2.4). The top, middle and bottom panel show the yearly series, quarterly and monthly series, respectively. Series
for services exports and imports are given in the left and right panel, respectively.
volatility of the Direct component shows a relatively stable pattern over time. Relative to
the actual standard deviation, the volatility of idiosyncratic shocks, though non-negligible, is
smaller and amounts to 16 and 13 percent for exports and imports, respectively. The finding
that network linkages between firms explain most of total idiosyncratic volatility is again robust
with respect to firms’ sales in France as shown by di Giovanni et al. (2014).
However, this picture significantly changes when looking at monthly frequency. While link-
ages between firms still are the dominant driving force, the standard deviation of the Direct
component relative to actual volatility amounts to more than 40 percent for exports and im-
ports, respectively. The bottom panel of Figure 2.4 shows the evolution of each component for
monthly frequency. The series of the Direct component is highly volatile and characterized by
large spikes over the whole sample. Hence, shocks to individual trade relationships alone have
a considerable impact in the short run. At yearly frequency, the impact of the Link component
becomes larger as the number of active firms and the number of trade relationships increases,
giving rise to potential inter-firm linkages through which shocks to individual trade relationships
propagate which in turn leads to comovement across firms. This provides empirical support that
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both arguments for the Direct and Link component to matter for aggregate fluctuations, are
not different channels, but instead, mutually intertwined driving forces, as recently argued by
Gabaix (2016).
2.4.4 Diversification of Idiosyncratic Shocks Within Firms
Given that Section 2.3 showed that there are not only differences in the decomposition of trade
portfolios in terms of trading partners and services across firms, but also a high concentration
on transaction with core trade relationships within firms, we now analyse how overall volatility
is affected when taking the diversification within firms into account. To this end, we consolidate
shocks stemming from individual trade relationships within firms, i.e. we shut down the exten-
sive margin within firms as an additional source of variation. While our focus so far was on the
contribution of idiosyncratic shocks to individual firms’ trade relationships, we now analyse how
shocks to individual firms’ overall trade affect aggregate fluctuations by taking the allocation of
individual firms’ trade portfolios seriously.
In order to asses the impact of firms’ diversification, we decompose weights of firms’ individ-
ual trade relationships, wfcst, into a between- and a within-firm component as
wfcst =
xfcst + xfcst−1
xt + xt−1
=
xft + xft−1
xt + xt−1
× xfcst + xfcst−1
xft + xft−1
= wbetweenft w
within
fsct ,
which allows a consolidation of growth rates of trade relationships within a firm. The consoli-
dated actual variance of firm growth with between-firm weights being fixed at their time τ value
can then be written as:
σ2γ′τ = Var
∑
fsc
wbetweenfτ w
within
fsct γfsct
 = Var
∑
f
wbetweenfτ γft
 . (2.5)
Analogously, the variance of idiosyncratic shocks to firms’ sales or purchases with between-firm
weights being fixed at their time τ value is given by
σ2ξτ = Var
∑
fsc
wbetweenfτ w
within
fsct εfsct
 = Var
∑
f
wbetweenfτ ξft
 , (2.6)
where ξft represents shocks to individual firms’ overall exports or imports. Hence, this measure
diversifies shocks stemming from firms’ individual trade relationships.12
12This measure is more in line with empirical studies which focus on the role of idiosyncratic shocks to firms’
overall sales rather than individual trade flows, as e.g. Gabaix (2011).
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Table 2.7 presents the results of this decomposition for monthly, quarterly and yearly fre-
quencies. The first column of each block of frequencies presents averages of the diversified
actual volatility, the volatility of shocks at the macro-meso-level, and the diversified idiosyn-
cratic volatility, respectively.13 The second column presents averages of standard deviations
relative to the diversified actual volatility. Results for exports and imports are given in the top
and bottom panel, respectively.
Table 2.7: Contribution to Service Trade Volatility: Macro-Meso and Diversified Idiosyncratic
Shocks
monthly quarterly yearly
SD Rel. SD SD Rel. SD SD Rel. SD
Service Exports
Diversified Actual 0.1213 1.0000 0.1155 1.0000 0.1230 1.0000
Macro-Meso 0.0919 0.7906 0.0828 0.7596 0.0812 0.7330
Diversified Idiosyncratic 0.0947 0.7684 0.0967 0.8251 0.1087 0.8701
Service Imports
Diversified Actual 0.1044 1.0000 0.1032 1.0000 0.1139 1.0000
Macro-Meso 0.0912 0.8988 0.0838 0.8559 0.0863 0.8363
Diversified Idiosyncratic 0.0862 0.8317 0.0884 0.8686 0.0972 0.8657
Notes: This table shows the contribution of macro-meso and diversified idiosyncratic shocks,
as given by equation (2.6), to diversified actual services trade volatility, as given by equa-
tion (2.5), for monthly, quarterly and yearly frequencies. The first column of each block of
frequencies presents averages of the standard deviations over the sample (i.e. 1/T
∑
σnτ
for n ∈ {γ′, δ, ξ}). The second column presents averages of standard deviations relative to
aggregate (diversified) volatility (i.e. 1/T
∑
σnτ/σγ′τ for n ∈ {γ′, δ, ξ}). Results for exports
and imports are given in the top and bottom panel, respectively.
Table 2.7 shows that firms’ individual diversification reduces actual volatility at all frequen-
cies. At yearly frequency diversified actual volatility of exports and imports is 38 and 44 percent
lower compared to undiversified actual volatility, see Table 2.4. In addition, the consolidation
of shocks stemming from individual trade relationships reduces firm-specific export and import
volatility by 37 and 46 percent, respectively, while the relative contribution is by and large the
same.14
As seen in Section 2.4.1, the undiversified idiosyncratic volatility increases at lower frequency
13The variance of shocks at the macro-meso-level is not affected by the diversification within firms.
14This is consistent with recent findings by Kramarz et al. (2015). Using yearly data on French firms’ trade
networks and a different decomposition metric, the authors show that while controlling for the impact of macro-
level shocks and shocks specific to individual firms, shocks to seller-buyer relationships are quantitatively important
for overall volatility.
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since firms’ transactions are lumpy and they trade only very infrequently in the course of a year.
Table 2.7 shows that the increase in diversified idiosyncratic volatility from monthly to yearly
frequency is only very modest. Hence, the consolidation of shocks among trading partners
diversifies the lumpiness of transactions to a large extent. These findings suggest, that when it
comes to an assessment of the impact of the openness to trade on overall volatility, it is crucial
to be aware of the level of (dis)aggregation, both, along the time as well as along firm-level
dimension.
We also decompose diversified firm-specific shocks into shocks to individual firms alone, the
Direct component, and the volatility due to comovement between firms, the Link component,
see Table A.2.3. Since the diversified volatility measure consolidates shocks stemming from
firms’ individual trade relationships, giving less rise to trade linkages and leaving as only source
of comovement links between firms’ total sales, we find the Link component to be slightly
less important compared to our results in Table 2.6. In contrast, we would expect the Direct
component to increase in importance as weights attached to firms’ total sales are higher than for
individual trade relationships giving a more prominent role to larger firms. Though comovement
still is relatively more important in explaining actual service trade volatility, we indeed find that
the contribution of the Direct component more than doubles at yearly frequency. In addition,
shocks to individual firms alone are even as important as linkages between firms for exports
with a standard deviation relative to actual diversified volatility of nearly 70 percent at monthly
frequency. This confirms our finding from the previous sub-section that both channels are
actually two sides of the same coin that are mutually important for aggregate fluctuations.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyse how firm-level activities shape aggregate services trade volatility. We
find that idiosyncratic shocks stemming from firms’ trade relationships are most important for
explaining overall services trade volatility with a relative contribution of more than 80 percent.
In addition, idiosyncratic volatility is increasing from monthly to yearly frequency reflecting
the lumpiness of firms transactions and firms’ imperfect intertemporal diversification. We find
that comovement between firms explains most of idiosyncratic fluctuations at all frequencies.
However, their impact decreases at monthly frequency while the impact of shocks to firms’
trade relationships alone becomes larger, suggesting that both components are mutually im-
portant for explaining idiosyncratic volatility. Finally, when consolidating shocks to individual
trade relationships within firms, we find aggregate services trade and firm-specific idiosyncratic
volatility to be roughly 40 percent smaller. Given that the absolute and relative contribution
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of idiosyncratic volatility is by and large the same across frequencies, this also implies that the
consolidation of shocks within firms also diversifies the lumpiness of firms’ transactions.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
Table A.2.1: Heterogeneity Within Firms, Transactions, Monthly Averages for 2001-2012
Rank of transaction Trade Within-firm
1 2 3 4 5 10 25 volume HI HInorm
Percent of exports
Exact 2 transactions 74.61 25.39 − − − − − 1,099 0.67 0.33
Exact 3 transactions 64.84 24.18 10.98 − − − − 1,711 0.54 0.31
Exact 4 transactions 58.87 23.25 11.74 6.14 − − − 2,068 0.47 0.29
Exact 5 transactions 55.49 22.24 11.67 6.74 3.86 − − 2,804 0.43 0.28
Exact 10 transactions 44.41 19.81 11.64 7.59 5.30 1.06 − 4,437 0.31 0.23
Exact 25 transactions 33.36 15.85 10.39 7.46 5.72 2.19 0.17 21,207 0.20 0.16
Percent of imports
Exact 2 transactions 72.29 27.71 − − − − − 650 0.64 0.28
Exact 3 transactions 62.36 25.06 12.58 − − − − 667 0.51 0.27
Exact 4 transactions 56.69 23.55 12.57 7.18 − − − 701 0.44 0.26
Exact 5 transactions 53.12 22.40 12.41 7.49 4.58 − − 987 0.40 0.25
Exact 10 transactions 43.00 19.66 11.84 7.91 5.60 1.14 − 1,818 0.29 0.21
Exact 25 transactions 32.49 16.01 10.51 7.63 5.84 2.13 0.17 8,433 0.19 0.16
Notes: This table shows the average shares (in percent) of exports and imports for those transactions ranked
first, second, third, etc. and firms that engage exactly two, three, four, etc. times in service-country trade in
a given year. Average trade volumes are rounded and reported in thousand Euro. HI and HInorm denote
the usual and normalised within-firm Herfindahl index, respectively (see footnote 2).
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Chapter 3
A Structural Quantitative Analysis
of Services Trade De-liberalization
∗
3.1 Introduction
While services transactions account for the lion’s share of economic activity in developed economies,
and such transactions often cross national borders, many quantitative open-economy models por-
tray countries to produce manufacturing goods only (see, e.g., Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003,
Costinot et al., 2012), or services to be non-tradable (see, e.g., Eaton and Kortum, 2002). One
consequence of this practice is that we know much less about key parameters governing quantita-
tive responses of the services sector than about those of manufacturing. For example, there is a
wealth of results on the so-called trade elasticity (with all its different theory-dependent interpre-
tations) for goods (see Broda and Weinstein, 2006, Kee et al., 2008, 2009) and, more recently, on
the shape parameter of the productivity distribution of manufacturers (see Eaton et al., 2011).
Similar results are much scarcer for services as high-quality data on services-producing firms and
their trade have become available only recently (e.g., Breinlich and Criscuolo, 2011, as well as
Ariu, 2016a, provide evidence for the United Kingdom and Belgium, respectively; Caliendo and
Parro, 2015, is one of the few quantitative multi-sector-multi-country analyses covering goods
as well as services sectors).
The present paper analyzes census-type data on services producers and traders in Germany,
which is one of the most important open economies on the globe. We contribute to the liter-
ature by informing a quantifiable multi-sector-multi-country model of goods and services pro-
duction and consumption, which allows the calibration of overall (variable and fixed) costs to
∗This chapter is joint work with Peter H. Egger (ETH Zu¨rich), Valeria Merlo (University of Tu¨bingen) and
Georg Wamser (University of Tu¨bingen). The disclaimer above applies.
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market-specific sales in a sector and decomposing these costs into observable and unobservable
components. The model features sector-specific markups, market-penetration and productivity-
distribution parameters, as well as overall (variable and fixed) transaction costs. The latter
parameter varies by sector and exporter-importer country pair.
All of the fundamental parameters are estimated and calibrated on the basis of three datasets:
one pertaining to transaction-level data of services exports of firms in Germany; one pertaining
to overall sales of manufactures and services of firms in Germany; and one pertaining to input-
output relationships for multiple countries and sectors.
The transaction-level data suggest that the (export) sales distribution of services is not
Pareto, and that matching the data requires allowing for sector-destination-country-specific
shape parameters of a single-parameter Pareto distribution as well as of an imperfect penetration
of the sector and country across exporters. The corresponding parametrization is able to capture
the distribution of sales across sectors quite well. Moreover, the data suggest that the variance
of (normalized) overall transaction costs differs substantially across the considered service-sector
aggregates, being largest for Construction Services. Across all considered sectors, the role of
geographical distance is for overall transaction costs relatively minor, while preferential services-
market access through trade agreements reduces transaction costs substantially. Hence, the
(inverse-)distance equivalent to preferential services-market access is large.
We proceed by using the partial effects of preferential market access on services transaction
costs to study the exit – or de-liberalization – from preferential services trade agreements by
individual countries and, alternatively, all covered countries jointly. The corresponding findings
suggest that abandoning preferential market access bilaterally and reciprocally for a large and
remote economy (with relatively little preferential market access ex ante) such as the United
States leads to a relatively small reduction of real consumption below 0.1 percent with effects on
real wages and dividends of a similar magnitude. The effect amounts to about 0.3 percent for
a somewhat smaller and less remote country (that operates under relatively wider preferential
market access ex ante) such as the United Kingdom. And the effect amounts to about 0.9 percent
for a small, central, open economy such as Belgium. When de-liberalizing preferential services-
market access on a world-wide basis as of 2014, the model suggests that real consumption will
drop across countries in the range of 0.1 percent to 12.5 percent (depending on the country).
The effects on real wages and dividends are quantified at a similar magnitude, and negative
effects are found even for manufactures, on average, although we kept preferential market access
and the other policy environment unchanged for the latter sector.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The subsequent section introduces
our data. Section 3.3 outlines the key elements of our firm-level model. Section 3.4 presents
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the estimation of the fundamental model parameters. Section 3.5 presents the multi-country-
multi-sector general equilibrium. Section 3.6 outlines the effects of a partial removal of deep
preferential market access in multi-country-multi-sector general equilibrium. The last section
concludes with a brief summary of our findings.
3.2 Data
In order to conduct our analysis we use transaction-level, firm-level as well as country-sector-level
information that comes from various sources.
First, we use the International Trade in Services Statistics (SITS) compiled by the Deutsche
Bundesbank and provided by its Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC). A detailed de-
scription of this dataset can be found in Biewen and Lohner (2017). The data entails detailed
information on German firms’ services exports at the transaction-level, i.e. the period of the
occurrence of transactions, the destination country and the type of service traded. Service trans-
actions with an overall outgoing value exceeding 12,500 Euro per month needs to be reported.1
The data covers all modes of services transactions of the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS), i.e. cross-border trade (mode 1), consumption abroad (mode 2), and the presence of
natural persons in the country of the customer (mode 4) with the only exception being services
transactions of foreign affiliates in the country of the customer (mode 3). From 2014 onwards
individual transactions have to be reported according to the sixth version of the IMF’s Bal-
ance of Payments and the International Investment Position Manual (BPM6) that contains a
more detailed breakdown of services transactions compared to the BPM5. For the sake of our
econometric analyses, however, we group individual transactions into one of five broad service
categories: Transport Services, Construction Services, Information and Communication (ICT)
Services, Other Business Services and Other Services.2 In addition, we drop sector-country
combinations with fewer than 50 observations. We restrict our sample to 28 EU countries and
15 other major countries plus the rest of the world for 2014.
Second, given that this transaction-level data does neither cover bilateral trade in manu-
factures nor German services sales at home, we refrain to German non-financial firms’ financial
statements (Ustan) as a bypass, which is also prepared by Deutsche Bundesbank, see Sto¨ß (2001)
1Hence, the volume traded that we observe in the data may actually comprise several transactions within a
given period of time. We stick to this slight abuse of terminology in order to distinguish this data conceptually
from the firm-level data we use.
2We broadly follow the IMF’s BPM6 Compilation Guide (2014), Chapter 12, see
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bop/2014/pdf/Guide.pdf (accessed December 2017). See the Appendix
for further details.
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for a description. This dataset covers firms’ overall sales and exports.3 This allows us to gather
information on exports to the rest of the world of German manufacturers as well as domestic
sales of firms belonging to the manufacturing and the five services sectors.4
Third, in order to extract information on our measure for barriers in international services
trade, its decomposition and to calibrate our model for the counterfactual analysis we use sector-
country information from the World Input-Output Database Release 2016 (WIOD), see Timmer
et al. (2015) and Timmer et al. (2016) as well as the CEPII database, see Head et al. (2010).
3.3 Theoretical Framework
Using firm-level data for Germany, we will demonstrate in the subsequent section that producers
of services in the aforementioned five sectors and producers in manufacturing make operating
profits, are heterogeneous as in Melitz (2003), do not serve all markets as in Helpman et al.
(2008), but the distribution of their sales deviates from a single-parameter Pareto distribution.
The literature proposes two alternative treatments for this problem, one of which is to part with
the Pareto assumption about firm productivity (see, e.g., Bas et al., 2015), the other one is to
superimpose an assumption about the imperfect penetration of consumer markets by the sellers
(see Arkolakis, 2010, Eaton et al., 2011). We follow the latter approach in what follows.
For the subsequent outline of the model, it will be useful to use indices v, s, i, and j to
denote firms, sectors, producer countries, and consumer countries, respectively. We use S and
J to denote the total number of sectors and countries in the world economy, respectively.
3.3.1 Firm-Level Trade
Following Arkolakis (2010), we assume that firm v in country i – offering one differentiated
variety v of sector-s output under monopolistic competition – must incur costs to penetrate
market j, with market penetration costs being paid in si-specific factor costs per efficiency unit,
csi ,
fsij(v) = c
s
if
s
ij
1−
[
1− nsij(v)
]1−1/λsj
1− 1/λsj
, (3.1)
where fsij > 0 is a common fixed cost for all producers in sector s and country i who target
consumers in country j and the second term on the right-hand side of equation (3.1) are firm-
3Note that the information on exports is provided by firms on a voluntary basis. Hence, in some cases a zero
may indicate no export activity or no information provided.
4As the focus of the paper is on services, we do not distinguish among manufacturing sectors but treat the
latter as one block.
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specific market penetration costs of the same producers to customers in country j. Market
penetration costs are increasing in the fraction of buyers reached, nsij(v) ∈ [0, 1], where the
degree of reach is governed by the shape parameter of the penetration cost function, λsj > 0.
An increase in λsj makes it easier to penetrate a market, resulting in higher overall entry costs.
As λsj → ∞, nsij(v) → 1 so that the market penetration cost specification in equation (3.1)
degenerates to the fixed cost specification as in Melitz (2003) or Helpman et al. (2008).
Buyers combine a continuum of varieties of sector-s output with a constant-elasticity-of-
substitution (CES) aggregator with elasticity σs > 1. Sales of firm v offering sector-s output in
market j and reaching a fraction nsij(v) of buyers are then given by
xsij(v) = n
s
ij(v)
(
psij(v)
P sj
)1−σs
Esj ,
where psij(v) is the price in country j for variety v which belongs in sector s and originates
from country i. P sj denotes the sectoral price index of sector-s output in country j, and E
s
j are
aggregate expenditures on sector-s output in country j. Total profits of firm v from providing
service s in country j are given by its operating profits, i.e. sales net of input costs, minus
market penetration costs
pisij(v) =
1
σs
nsij(v)
(
psij(v)
P sij
)1−σs
Esij − csifsij
1−
[
1− nsij(v)
]1−1/λsj
1− 1/λsj
.
Under monopolistic competition, psij(v) involves a fixed mark up over marginal costs of the form
psij(v) =
σs
σs − 1
τ sijc
s
i
φ(v)
,
where τ sij ≥ 1 are the common ad-valorem (iceberg) trade costs for sector s and shipments from
country i to country j, and φ(v) is the efficiency of firm v. The degree of market penetration is
optimal if an i-borne firm’s operating profits in sector s and market j for a buyer will just cover
the marginal costs of reaching that buyer:
1
σs
 σsσs−1 τsijcsiφ(v)
P sj
1−σs Esj = csifsij[
1− nsij(v)
]1/λsj . (3.2)
The marginal firm – indicated by ∗ – in sector s and country i will just not serve any customer
in market j so that nsij(v
∗) = 0. Using equation (3.2), the cutoff-efficiency level can be expressed
as
(
φs∗ij
)σs−1
= σscsif
s
ij
( σsσs−1τ sijcsi
P sj
)1−σs
Esj
−1 . (3.3)
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Inserting the expression for
(
φs∗ij
)σs−1
into equation (3.2) yields the firm-specific optimal degree
of market penetration as a function of firm v’s efficiency, φ(v):
nsij(v) = 1−
[
φs∗ij
φ(v)
](σs−1)λsj
.
For a given efficiency level φ(v) > φs∗ij , n
s
ij(v) is increasing in the degree of competition, σ
s, as
firms try to compensate for a decline in sales per buyer by reaching more buyers.
Using these insights, the value of sales of an i-borne firm v in sector s to buyers in destination
j can then be expressed as
xsij(v) = σ
scsif
s
ij
[
φ(v)
φ∗sij
]σs−1{
1−
[
φs∗ij
φ(v)
](σs−1)λsj}
(3.4)
= x˜sij(v)n
s
ij(v) ,
where x˜sij(v) are firm v’s sales of service s in market j per fraction of customers reached.
3.3.2 Producer Heterogeneity and Average Sales
Let us assume that there is a constant mass of firms in country i,Mi, which draw their efficiency
level from a Pareto distribution with support [bsi ,+∞). Rather than assuming that the shape
of the distribution is independent of the country where output is sold, as, e.g., in Eaton and
Kortum (2002) or Melitz (2003), we allow this shape to be specific for a sector and country of
destination of sales. Implicitly, this means that a fixed number of firms in a country of origin,
Mi, is quasi endowed with a minimum efficiency bsi , and gets a free draw of actual efficiency for
any destination country j from the aforementioned support with a shape parameter ksj > σ
s−1,
but still has to invest in market-access costs fsij(v) when willing to serve that market after all.
The probability that a firm v with productivity φ(v) is active in providing a service s out of
country i to market j is given by 1 − Pr
[
φ(v) < φs∗ij
]
=
(
bsi
φs∗ij
)ksj
. The measure of firms selling
sector-s output to country j is then given by
M sij =Mi
(
bsi
φs∗ij
)ksj
. (3.5)
Integrating bounded-Pareto-distributed firms’ sales, equation (3.4) gives average sales per
selling firm of
x¯sij =
∫ ∞
φs∗ij
xsij(v)k
s
j
(
φs∗ij
)ksj (φ)(−1−ksj ) dφ = σscsifsijΘsj , (3.6)
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with Θsj =
θsjλ
s
j
(1−θsj )[1−θsj (1−λj)]
and θsj =
σs−1
ksj
.5 Average sales of firms whose efficiency is higher
than φ(v) are given by:
x¯sij(v) = σ
scsif
s
ij
(
φs∗ij
φ(v)
)−(σs−1) [
1
1− θsj
− 1
1− θsij(1− λsij)
(
φs∗ij
φ(v)
)(σs−1)λj]
. (3.7)
For later use let us also define the ratio of equation (3.7) and equation (3.6)
x¯sij(v)
x¯sij
=
(
φs∗ij
φ(v)
)−(σs−1){1− θsj
θsjλj
[
1−
(
φs∗ij
φ(v)
)(σs−1)λj]
+ 1
}
. (3.8)
By the same token, average sales of firm v per fraction of buyers reached,
x˜sij(v) = σ
scsif
s
ij
(
φs∗ij
φ(v)
)−(σs−1)
,
can be written as
¯˜xsij =
σscsif
s
ij
1− θsij
.
The average of x˜sij(v) for firms whose efficiency is greater than φ(v) is then given by
¯˜xsij(v) =
σscsif
s
ij
1− θsj
(
φs∗ij
φ(v)
)−(σs−1)
. (3.9)
3.3.3 Aggregate Sales, Market Shares and Profits
Aggregate sales of all i-borne firms in sector s to market j are then given by
Xsij = M
s
ij x¯
s
ij = M
s
ijσ
scsif
s
ijΘ
s
j . (3.10)
Average total profits, p¯isij , are a constant multiple of average sales:
p¯isij = c
s
if
s
ijΘ
s
jθ
s
j =
θsj
σs
x¯sij . (3.11)
and aggregate sectoral profits are Πsi =
∑J
j=1Π
s
ij =
∑J
j=1M
s
ij p¯i
s
ij . The market share of country
i exporting varieties of sector s to country j can be written as
µsij =
Xsij
Esj
=
Xsij∑J
l=1X
s
lj
.
5This formulation has the advantage that θsj ∈ (0, 1).
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Following Arkolakis (2010), we can use equations (3.3), (3.5), and (3.10), and write the market
share as
µsij =
M sijσ
scsif
s
ijΘ
s
j∑J
l=1M
s
ljσ
scsl f
s
ljΘ
s
j
=
Mi
(
bsi
τsij
)ksj (
fsij
)1− 1
θs
j (csi )
1− 1
θs
j
−ksj
∑J
l=1Ml
(
bsl
τslj
)ksj (
fslj
)1− 1
θs
j
(
csl
)1− 1
θs
j
−ksj
.
It turns out that changes in the fixed component of market entry, fsij , and variable trade costs,
τ sij , affect aggregate outcomes in general equilibrium as ζ
s
ij ≡
(
τ sij
)−ksj (
fsij
)1− 1
θs
j . Hence, changes
in variable iceberg-type trade costs are observationally equivalent to scaled changes in the fixed
cost component of market access costs. Given the restriction ksj > σ
s − 1, an increase in τ sij
has a larger negative impact on ζsij than an increase in f
s
ij . The market share µ
s
ij can then be
written as
µsij =
Mi (bsi )k
s
j (csi )
1− 1
θs
j
−ksj
ζsij∑J
l=1Ml
(
bsl
)ksj (csl )1− 1θsj −ksj ζslj . (3.12)
3.4 Measuring the Fundamental Model Parameters
Fundamental parameters of the model can be determined in sequential steps. These steps will
pertain to measuring {σs}, {θsj , λsj , ksj}, and {ζsij}. We address each of these steps in the following.
3.4.1 Estimation of σs
As in any CES framework with monopolistic competition, firm v’s operating profits from selling
sector-s output in market j are proportional to the respective sales, namely xsij(v)/σ
s. Hence, we
can determine the elasticity of substitution by using information on firms’ balance-sheet data.6
We measure σs as the sum of firms’ sales belonging to sector s over all destination markets
divided by the sum of their corresponding operating profits. The results are summarized in
Table 3.1. We find the highest values of σ̂s for Other Sectors (7.65) and Construction Services
(6.00), suggesting high competition in these sectors. The lowest value (i.e., high market power)
is found for Other Services (3.27).
3.4.2 Estimation of θsj , λ
s
j and k
s
j
Towards estimating the structural parameters θsj and λ
s
j , note that, when distinguishing M
s
ij
quantiles in the distribution of sales of firms in country i and sector s to market j, the probability
6While we observe firms’ sales in the data directly, we calculate firms’ operating profits as revenues minus
personnel costs, material costs, and expenses on purchased services. We do not use earnings before the deduction
of interest and taxes as these also comprise expenses that are not reflected in the model.
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Table 3.1: Estimates of σs Using Firm-level Data
Sector σ̂s
Transport 5.164 (0.418)
Construction Services 5.997 (0.280)
IT Services 3.915 (0.244)
Other Business Services 4.512 (0.219)
Other Services 3.273 (0.078)
Manufacturing 4.855 (0.036)
Other Sectors (n.c.e.) 7.647 (0.102)
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
that a firm has higher efficiency than φ(v) can be written as
1− Prsij(v) =
(
φs∗ij
φ(v)
)ksj
=
ranksij(v)
M sij
, (3.13)
where, after sorting firms according to their rank in terms of sales and letting v denote this
rank, ranksij(v) = 100(v − 1). Since we focus on all firms rather than percentiles, ranksij(v) is
quasi-continuous. Notice that a stochastic version of the log-transformed equation (3.8) is
ln
[
x¯sij(v)
x¯sij
]
= −θsj ln
[
1− Prsij(v)
]
+ ln
[
1− θsj
θsjλ
s
j
{
1− [1− Prsij(v)](θsjλsj)}+ 1
]
+ εsvij ,(3.14)
from which θsj and λ
s
j could be principally estimated using non-linear least squares. However,
it turns out that this optimization problem is very flat, which makes it hard to estimate the
global optimum of {θsj , λsj} for each country j and sector s. We overcome this problem by
additionally using an expression for ¯˜xsij(v), which can be calculated as the cumulative average
of x˜ij(v) = x
s
ij/n
s
ij . Doing so involves the fraction of customers reached, which, using equation
(3.13), can be written as
nsij(v) = 1−
[
1− Prsij(v)
]θsjλsj . (3.15)
The latter and, hence, ¯˜xsij(v), depends on the yet unknown θ
s
jλ
s
j . After using the insight of
equation (3.15) in equation (3.9), a stochastic equation for ln ¯˜xsij(v) can be written as
ln ¯˜xsij(v) = ln
σscsf
s
ij
1− θsj
− θsj ln
[
1− Prsij(v)
]
+ ϵsvij . (3.16)
In order to estimate θsj and λ
s
j based on equations (3.14) and (3.16), we apply an iterative
procedure based on the following steps:
1. Form a guess about θsjλ
s
j and compute n
s
ij(v) and ln
¯˜xsij(v).
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2. Estimate equation (3.16) for each {sj} by OLS, where ln σ
scsfsij
1−θsj is a constant,
7 and θsj is
estimated as a parameter on ln
[
1− Prsij(v)
]
.
3. Reformulate equation (3.14) as
ln
[
x¯sij(v)
x¯sij
]
= −θsj ln
[
1− Prsij(v)
]
+ ln
[
1− θsj
θsjλ
s
j
nsij(v) + 1
]
+ εsvij ,
use the just-obtained estimate of θsj therein and estimate θ
s
jλ
s
j .
4. With the estimated θsjλ
s
j , repeat until convergence.
The results corresponding to this procedure are summarized in Tables 3.2 to 3.6. Each of the
tables corresponds to one sector and contains six column blocks of which four pertain to results
for the above model and two pertain to a Melitz-Chaney-type model (indicated by superscript
fixed without imperfect market penetration, where λ → ∞). In each column block, we report
point estimates and standard errors in parentheses for estimated parameters but, for the sake
of brevity, only point estimates for derived/computed parameters.8 Note that, given that there
is no trade (or an insufficient number of observations) in a few country-sector combinations,
involving mostly small economies, there are some empty lines in Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.6. As our
services-transactions dataset does not cover bilateral trade in manufactures and other sectors
and we know about the domestic sales (Germany) and global exports (Rest of the World) only
from firm-level financial statements of German firms, we summarize the corresponding results
more compactly in Table 3.7 and Table 3.8.
As all other parameters in Tables 3.2 to 3.6 are composites, we focus on a summary of the
results regarding the shape parameters of the market penetration cost function in the model of
interest here, λ̂sj , and of the firm-efficiency distribution, k̂
s
j , for the same model as well as the
Melitz-Chaney-type model.
Recall that a lower (higher) value of λsj means that relatively fewer (more) customers are
reached at lower (higher) corresponding market penetration costs. Across the five services sectors
in Tables 3.2 to 3.6, the average value of λ̂sj is highest for Transport Services (0.77) and lowest
for Other Services (0.33).9 The range of λ̂sj is very large across targeted countries and spans
7Note that the only country i in this estimation is Germany, so that fsij is a constant parameter.
8We run the above procedure using 100 different starting values for θsjλ
s
j . For the sake of faster convergence,
we set the parameter space of θsjλ
s
j at [0.001, 1000.000]. In some cases the estimate θ
s
jλ
s
j is at the lower bound
of the considered parameter space. However, this is of limited importance, as the boundary problem of θsjλ
s
j is
mainly absorbed by and reflected in the estimate of λsj , whereas it influences the estimate of θ
s
j to a lesser extent.
For the counterfactual analysis, θ̂sj matters but not λ̂
s
j .
9Notice that the moments of λsj we refer to are calculated from slightly different samples of countries across
the tables.
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Table 3.2: Estimates of θsj , λ
s
j and k
s
j Using Transaction-level Data, Transport Services
Main Model Fixed Cost Model
Country θ̂sjλ
s
j θ̂
s
j λ̂
s
j k̂
s
j
(
θ̂sj
)fix (
k̂sj
)fix
Australia 0.862 (0.268) 0.893 (0.068) 0.965 4.663 0.887 (0.013) 4.696
Austria 0.378 (0.045) 0.754 (0.030) 0.502 5.524 0.830 (0.014) 5.016
Belgium 0.421 (0.030) 0.733 (0.025) 0.574 5.684 0.801 (0.013) 5.196
Brazil 0.457 (0.194) 0.837 (0.065) 0.547 4.977 0.891 (0.012) 4.674
Bulgaria 0.732 (0.310) 0.821 (0.129) 0.892 5.071 0.839 (0.019) 4.963
Canada 0.589 (0.287) 0.893 (0.093) 0.659 4.665 0.909 (0.010) 4.579
China 0.449 (0.140) 0.857 (0.057) 0.524 4.857 0.897 (0.013) 4.640
Croatia 0.892 (0.395) 0.829 (0.103) 1.076 5.025 0.843 (0.020) 4.938
Cyprus 0.380 (0.076) 0.653 (0.045) 0.583 6.379 0.765 (0.022) 5.443
Czech Republic 0.518 (0.068) 0.799 (0.034) 0.648 5.213 0.837 (0.014) 4.976
Denmark 0.329 (0.063) 0.712 (0.047) 0.462 5.847 0.815 (0.016) 5.111
Estonia 0.362 (0.185) 0.630 (0.097) 0.575 6.612 0.770 (0.024) 5.410
Finland 0.416 (0.066) 0.658 (0.046) 0.631 6.325 0.755 (0.019) 5.516
France 0.244 (0.059) 0.690 (0.038) 0.354 6.031 0.822 (0.010) 5.062
Germany 0.468 (0.184) 0.843 (0.090) 0.555 4.937 0.886 (0.010) 4.699
Greece 0.001 (0.000) 0.517 (0.063) 0.002 8.050 0.871 (0.011) 4.779
Hungary 0.527 (0.141) 0.780 (0.063) 0.675 5.335 0.829 (0.016) 5.022
India 1.097 (0.268) 0.910 (0.063) 1.205 4.577 0.888 (0.015) 4.689
Indonesia 0.685 (0.308) 0.801 (0.104) 0.855 5.196 0.846 (0.020) 4.920
Ireland 0.382 (0.076) 0.596 (0.050) 0.641 6.988 0.722 (0.019) 5.768
Italy 0.390 (0.082) 0.810 (0.049) 0.481 5.142 0.871 (0.016) 4.780
Japan 0.376 (0.136) 0.757 (0.064) 0.497 5.502 0.844 (0.013) 4.931
Korea 0.553 (0.080) 0.765 (0.037) 0.722 5.441 0.809 (0.018) 5.149
Latvia 0.394 (0.178) 0.584 (0.117) 0.675 7.129 0.722 (0.030) 5.765
Lithuania 0.001 (0.002) 0.583 (0.044) 0.002 7.142 0.867 (0.012) 4.802
Luxembourg 0.323 (0.129) 0.768 (0.056) 0.421 5.422 0.864 (0.012) 4.821
Malta 0.514 (0.301) 0.673 (0.162) 0.764 6.187 0.774 (0.029) 5.382
Mexico 0.913 (0.234) 0.881 (0.045) 1.035 4.724 0.880 (0.016) 4.731
Netherlands 0.352 (0.022) 0.716 (0.025) 0.491 5.815 0.805 (0.013) 5.170
Norway 0.322 (0.093) 0.679 (0.059) 0.474 6.133 0.798 (0.018) 5.220
Poland 0.371 (0.105) 0.830 (0.042) 0.447 5.014 0.892 (0.007) 4.666
Portugal 0.001 (0.088) 0.540 (0.078) 0.002 7.716 0.807 (0.017) 5.158
Romania 0.720 (0.264) 0.865 (0.088) 0.833 4.816 0.870 (0.015) 4.784
Russian Federation 0.462 (0.121) 0.803 (0.058) 0.575 5.183 0.855 (0.015) 4.869
Slovakia 0.810 (0.180) 0.821 (0.053) 0.987 5.074 0.824 (0.019) 5.054
Slovenia 0.647 (0.351) 0.840 (0.156) 0.770 4.955 0.870 (0.013) 4.787
Spain 0.392 (0.065) 0.752 (0.043) 0.522 5.540 0.828 (0.016) 5.030
Sweden 0.446 (0.048) 0.733 (0.032) 0.609 5.678 0.799 (0.014) 5.209
Switzerland 0.297 (0.044) 0.713 (0.032) 0.416 5.836 0.822 (0.012) 5.063
Taiwan 0.391 (0.140) 0.669 (0.079) 0.584 6.224 0.781 (0.018) 5.329
Turkey 0.456 (0.093) 0.770 (0.052) 0.592 5.407 0.830 (0.017) 5.016
United Kingdom 0.001 (0.009) 0.665 (0.038) 0.002 6.259 0.903 (0.006) 4.612
United States of America 0.375 (0.138) 0.890 (0.054) 0.421 4.678 0.930 (0.007) 4.478
Rest of the World 0.346 (0.067) 0.861 (0.041) 0.401 4.835 0.912 (0.011) 4.566
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Table 3.3: Estimates of θsj , λ
s
j and k
s
j Using Transaction-level Data, Construction Services
Main Model Fixed Cost Model
Country θ̂sjλ
s
j θ̂
s
j λ̂
s
j k̂
s
j
(
θ̂sj
)fix (
k̂sj
)fix
Australia
Austria 0.193 (0.114) 0.651 (0.074) 0.296 7.676 0.819 (0.014) 6.101
Belgium 0.481 (0.031) 0.519 (0.034) 0.927 9.626 0.622 (0.025) 8.031
Brazil
Bulgaria
Canada
China 0.963 (0.279) 0.791 (0.084) 1.218 6.321 0.795 (0.025) 6.284
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic 0.607 (0.111) 0.631 (0.056) 0.961 7.913 0.703 (0.030) 7.104
Denmark 0.232 (0.138) 0.571 (0.090) 0.406 8.758 0.764 (0.022) 6.544
Estonia
Finland 0.835 (0.245) 0.717 (0.089) 1.165 6.973 0.759 (0.038) 6.581
France 0.571 (0.128) 0.782 (0.055) 0.730 6.388 0.823 (0.017) 6.070
Germany 0.247 (0.026) 0.561 (0.029) 0.440 8.909 0.725 (0.015) 6.888
Greece
Hungary 0.001 (0.019) 0.395 (0.061) 0.003 12.651 0.747 (0.027) 6.687
India
Indonesia
Ireland
Italy 0.728 (0.288) 0.805 (0.108) 0.905 6.211 0.825 (0.020) 6.054
Japan
Korea
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg 0.219 (0.110) 0.535 (0.070) 0.410 9.348 0.734 (0.022) 6.805
Malta
Mexico
Netherlands 0.370 (0.038) 0.561 (0.030) 0.659 8.909 0.689 (0.019) 7.249
Norway 1.525 (33.422) 0.809 (0.077) 1.886 6.180 0.779 (0.044) 6.410
Poland 0.365 (0.090) 0.545 (0.054) 0.668 9.161 0.695 (0.024) 7.194
Portugal
Romania 2.170 (51.521) 0.861 (0.112) 2.520 5.802 0.819 (0.033) 6.104
Russian Federation 0.070 (0.067) 0.682 (0.069) 0.103 7.327 0.883 (0.011) 5.656
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain 0.001 (0.056) 0.523 (0.096) 0.002 9.550 0.830 (0.016) 6.022
Sweden 0.541 (0.127) 0.684 (0.061) 0.791 7.307 0.763 (0.030) 6.552
Switzerland 0.345 (0.097) 0.617 (0.067) 0.560 8.096 0.747 (0.023) 6.692
Taiwan
Turkey 0.420 (0.236) 0.663 (0.120) 0.634 7.537 0.788 (0.024) 6.340
United Kingdom 0.556 (0.053) 0.659 (0.034) 0.844 7.588 0.719 (0.023) 6.947
United States of America 0.782 (0.298) 0.787 (0.087) 0.993 6.348 0.813 (0.027) 6.143
Rest of the World 0.551 (0.103) 0.794 (0.042) 0.694 6.292 0.834 (0.016) 5.991
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Table 3.4: Estimates of θsj , λ
s
j and k
s
j Using Transaction-level Data, ICT Services
Main Model Fixed Cost Model
Country θ̂sjλ
s
j θ̂
s
j λ̂
s
j k̂
s
j
(
θ̂sj
)fix (
k̂sj
)fix
Australia 0.001 (0.124) 0.581 (0.119) 0.002 5.020 0.839 (0.014) 3.475
Austria 0.001 (0.017) 0.541 (0.027) 0.002 5.392 0.817 (0.008) 3.568
Belgium 0.272 (0.075) 0.620 (0.047) 0.439 4.705 0.768 (0.014) 3.794
Brazil 0.242 (0.177) 0.627 (0.115) 0.386 4.650 0.794 (0.024) 3.672
Bulgaria 0.396 (0.222) 0.677 (0.134) 0.585 4.306 0.811 (0.020) 3.596
Canada 0.001 (0.004) 0.461 (0.059) 0.002 6.327 0.809 (0.015) 3.605
China 0.172 (0.093) 0.625 (0.058) 0.276 4.663 0.807 (0.012) 3.613
Croatia 0.001 (0.036) 0.542 (0.066) 0.002 5.380 0.839 (0.016) 3.473
Cyprus
Czech Republic 0.407 (0.130) 0.761 (0.067) 0.535 3.830 0.838 (0.015) 3.477
Denmark 0.449 (0.089) 0.723 (0.048) 0.621 4.033 0.798 (0.016) 3.655
Estonia
Finland 0.001 (0.025) 0.598 (0.049) 0.002 4.875 0.860 (0.014) 3.390
France 0.350 (0.044) 0.732 (0.030) 0.478 3.984 0.821 (0.012) 3.551
Germany 0.162 (0.132) 0.676 (0.086) 0.240 4.314 0.846 (0.013) 3.446
Greece 0.001 (0.002) 0.449 (0.077) 0.002 6.497 0.837 (0.015) 3.483
Hungary 0.532 (0.118) 0.753 (0.054) 0.706 3.872 0.808 (0.020) 3.608
India 0.369 (0.202) 0.775 (0.101) 0.477 3.763 0.864 (0.013) 3.374
Indonesia 0.001 (0.014) 0.276 (0.073) 0.004 10.549 0.684 (0.031) 4.260
Ireland 0.197 (0.108) 0.699 (0.054) 0.281 4.168 0.852 (0.013) 3.423
Italy 0.284 (0.077) 0.662 (0.050) 0.429 4.403 0.794 (0.016) 3.671
Japan 0.290 (0.135) 0.654 (0.072) 0.443 4.455 0.799 (0.019) 3.648
Korea 0.057 (0.141) 0.555 (0.121) 0.102 5.256 0.808 (0.020) 3.609
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg 0.342 (0.110) 0.687 (0.056) 0.498 4.244 0.802 (0.017) 3.634
Malta
Mexico 0.194 (0.173) 0.598 (0.122) 0.324 4.876 0.791 (0.023) 3.683
Netherlands 0.079 (0.068) 0.661 (0.045) 0.119 4.410 0.855 (0.009) 3.411
Norway 0.287 (0.167) 0.573 (0.118) 0.501 5.089 0.748 (0.026) 3.896
Poland 0.016 (0.076) 0.543 (0.068) 0.029 5.372 0.803 (0.014) 3.629
Portugal 0.454 (0.089) 0.607 (0.053) 0.747 4.800 0.715 (0.023) 4.079
Romania 0.460 (0.146) 0.673 (0.076) 0.684 4.333 0.767 (0.020) 3.801
Russian Federation 0.403 (0.108) 0.675 (0.059) 0.598 4.318 0.776 (0.020) 3.755
Slovakia 0.486 (0.100) 0.623 (0.056) 0.780 4.680 0.720 (0.024) 4.046
Slovenia 0.273 (0.213) 0.636 (0.129) 0.430 4.580 0.810 (0.021) 3.599
Spain 0.001 (0.001) 0.623 (0.031) 0.002 4.676 0.892 (0.008) 3.267
Sweden 0.382 (0.124) 0.767 (0.060) 0.498 3.801 0.848 (0.014) 3.436
Switzerland 0.169 (0.074) 0.666 (0.051) 0.253 4.375 0.831 (0.012) 3.510
Taiwan 0.001 (0.000) 0.298 (0.065) 0.003 9.775 0.732 (0.031) 3.982
Turkey 0.439 (0.080) 0.634 (0.047) 0.693 4.598 0.734 (0.018) 3.973
United Kingdom 0.382 (0.052) 0.804 (0.031) 0.475 3.624 0.866 (0.011) 3.367
United States of America 0.095 (0.085) 0.700 (0.056) 0.136 4.164 0.873 (0.010) 3.339
Rest of the World 0.289 (0.103) 0.775 (0.052) 0.373 3.762 0.871 (0.011) 3.345
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Table 3.5: Estimates of θsj , λ
s
j and k
s
j Using Transaction-level Data, Other Business Services
Main Model Fixed Cost Model
Country θ̂sjλ
s
j θ̂
s
j λ̂
s
j k̂
s
j
(
θ̂sj
)fix (
k̂sj
)fix
Australia 0.258 (0.067) 0.630 (0.050) 0.409 5.571 0.779 (0.016) 4.508
Austria 0.178 (0.029) 0.636 (0.031) 0.280 5.523 0.804 (0.013) 4.366
Belgium 0.272 (0.049) 0.779 (0.038) 0.349 4.509 0.874 (0.013) 4.020
Brazil 0.179 (0.107) 0.640 (0.084) 0.279 5.488 0.812 (0.023) 4.323
Bulgaria 0.288 (0.072) 0.505 (0.058) 0.570 6.951 0.682 (0.021) 5.147
Canada 0.158 (0.104) 0.658 (0.080) 0.241 5.337 0.830 (0.020) 4.229
China 0.273 (0.061) 0.793 (0.047) 0.344 4.429 0.883 (0.015) 3.977
Croatia 0.297 (0.049) 0.461 (0.040) 0.644 7.616 0.640 (0.019) 5.485
Cyprus 0.001 (0.079) 0.652 (0.120) 0.002 5.388 0.903 (0.006) 3.889
Czech Republic 0.126 (0.112) 0.739 (0.095) 0.170 4.750 0.888 (0.020) 3.953
Denmark 0.195 (0.066) 0.637 (0.057) 0.307 5.516 0.803 (0.019) 4.376
Estonia 0.001 (0.000) 0.329 (0.057) 0.003 10.665 0.765 (0.015) 4.591
Finland 0.257 (0.056) 0.626 (0.051) 0.410 5.609 0.776 (0.019) 4.528
France 0.171 (0.036) 0.689 (0.026) 0.248 5.097 0.842 (0.008) 4.172
Germany 0.268 (0.055) 0.598 (0.051) 0.448 5.874 0.750 (0.022) 4.685
Greece 0.161 (0.074) 0.511 (0.045) 0.316 6.878 0.728 (0.015) 4.821
Hungary 0.001 (0.028) 0.702 (0.040) 0.001 5.005 0.912 (0.005) 3.850
India 0.172 (0.062) 0.594 (0.041) 0.289 5.913 0.780 (0.012) 4.500
Indonesia 0.352 (0.077) 0.586 (0.052) 0.602 5.994 0.723 (0.021) 4.857
Ireland 0.306 (0.087) 0.802 (0.048) 0.382 4.381 0.884 (0.012) 3.973
Italy 0.274 (0.016) 0.662 (0.019) 0.415 5.306 0.785 (0.010) 4.475
Japan 0.319 (0.045) 0.756 (0.028) 0.422 4.646 0.847 (0.010) 4.146
Korea 0.330 (0.061) 0.727 (0.044) 0.454 4.829 0.825 (0.014) 4.259
Latvia 0.394 (0.054) 0.415 (0.045) 0.950 8.465 0.584 (0.026) 6.018
Lithuania 0.185 (0.137) 0.481 (0.101) 0.384 7.295 0.714 (0.026) 4.917
Luxembourg 0.334 (0.030) 0.709 (0.027) 0.471 4.951 0.805 (0.014) 4.363
Malta 0.049 (0.077) 0.557 (0.062) 0.089 6.308 0.809 (0.020) 4.343
Mexico 0.059 (0.136) 0.712 (0.118) 0.083 4.934 0.892 (0.015) 3.937
Netherlands 0.277 (0.020) 0.733 (0.025) 0.378 4.789 0.839 (0.013) 4.188
Norway 0.310 (0.038) 0.621 (0.029) 0.500 5.659 0.749 (0.013) 4.687
Poland 0.053 (0.055) 0.617 (0.048) 0.086 5.694 0.834 (0.012) 4.213
Portugal 0.094 (0.105) 0.660 (0.083) 0.143 5.322 0.852 (0.014) 4.121
Romania 0.001 (0.000) 0.552 (0.031) 0.002 6.358 0.875 (0.007) 4.012
Russian Federation 0.251 (0.045) 0.647 (0.037) 0.388 5.429 0.789 (0.013) 4.449
Slovakia 0.405 (0.054) 0.725 (0.035) 0.558 4.842 0.803 (0.016) 4.375
Slovenia 0.289 (0.087) 0.561 (0.070) 0.515 6.256 0.725 (0.024) 4.841
Spain 0.142 (0.065) 0.675 (0.050) 0.210 5.206 0.843 (0.013) 4.166
Sweden 0.258 (0.041) 0.677 (0.031) 0.381 5.189 0.807 (0.011) 4.353
Switzerland 0.337 (0.021) 0.858 (0.015) 0.392 4.092 0.908 (0.007) 3.867
Taiwan 0.325 (0.130) 0.695 (0.085) 0.468 5.057 0.812 (0.020) 4.328
Turkey 0.004 (0.046) 0.502 (0.048) 0.009 7.003 0.777 (0.014) 4.521
United Kingdom 0.258 (0.025) 0.756 (0.022) 0.342 4.645 0.860 (0.009) 4.082
United States of America 0.266 (0.036) 0.826 (0.034) 0.322 4.254 0.905 (0.013) 3.883
Rest of the World 0.332 (0.014) 0.741 (0.014) 0.449 4.739 0.825 (0.008) 4.254
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Table 3.6: Estimates of θsj , λ
s
j and k
s
j Using Transaction-level Data, Other Services
Main Model Fixed Cost Model
Country θ̂sjλ
s
j θ̂
s
j λ̂
s
j k̂
s
j
(
θ̂sj
)fix (
k̂sj
)fix
Australia 0.649 (0.131) 0.913 (0.028) 0.710 2.488 0.917 (0.008) 2.479
Austria 0.307 (0.041) 0.813 (0.029) 0.377 2.794 0.888 (0.010) 2.560
Belgium 0.388 (0.043) 0.833 (0.021) 0.466 2.728 0.884 (0.009) 2.571
Brazil 0.564 (0.111) 0.889 (0.034) 0.634 2.556 0.904 (0.009) 2.514
Bulgaria 0.506 (0.071) 0.705 (0.039) 0.718 3.224 0.771 (0.018) 2.949
Canada 0.589 (0.072) 0.869 (0.023) 0.678 2.615 0.883 (0.011) 2.573
China 0.424 (0.065) 0.886 (0.024) 0.479 2.564 0.918 (0.008) 2.477
Croatia 0.446 (0.056) 0.670 (0.030) 0.666 3.394 0.759 (0.023) 2.993
Cyprus 0.430 (0.220) 0.761 (0.110) 0.566 2.987 0.845 (0.016) 2.690
Czech Republic 0.238 (0.080) 0.740 (0.043) 0.322 3.071 0.860 (0.009) 2.643
Denmark 0.299 (0.100) 0.759 (0.062) 0.393 2.994 0.858 (0.015) 2.648
Estonia 0.493 (0.178) 0.607 (0.097) 0.812 3.742 0.716 (0.027) 3.174
Finland 0.258 (0.132) 0.684 (0.084) 0.377 3.321 0.821 (0.020) 2.767
France 0.285 (0.094) 0.863 (0.054) 0.330 2.633 0.925 (0.012) 2.456
Germany 0.245 (0.019) 0.733 (0.022) 0.334 3.100 0.849 (0.010) 2.678
Greece 0.284 (0.108) 0.815 (0.041) 0.349 2.790 0.902 (0.011) 2.519
Hungary 0.408 (0.064) 0.794 (0.029) 0.514 2.864 0.854 (0.011) 2.660
India 0.468 (0.156) 0.870 (0.067) 0.538 2.611 0.902 (0.012) 2.520
Indonesia 0.264 (0.205) 0.738 (0.116) 0.357 3.080 0.864 (0.014) 2.630
Ireland 0.240 (0.124) 0.853 (0.059) 0.282 2.666 0.930 (0.005) 2.443
Italy 0.389 (0.049) 0.869 (0.024) 0.448 2.615 0.909 (0.007) 2.499
Japan 0.310 (0.132) 0.870 (0.053) 0.356 2.611 0.929 (0.006) 2.447
Korea 0.489 (0.117) 0.837 (0.044) 0.584 2.715 0.878 (0.011) 2.589
Latvia 0.437 (0.147) 0.640 (0.082) 0.683 3.553 0.752 (0.025) 3.023
Lithuania 0.341 (0.191) 0.618 (0.118) 0.552 3.679 0.770 (0.021) 2.950
Luxembourg 0.371 (0.044) 0.831 (0.029) 0.446 2.736 0.886 (0.011) 2.565
Malta 0.002 (0.039) 0.631 (0.047) 0.003 3.600 0.867 (0.015) 2.620
Mexico 0.133 (0.094) 0.830 (0.046) 0.160 2.739 0.938 (0.005) 2.422
Netherlands 0.360 (0.044) 0.860 (0.023) 0.419 2.643 0.908 (0.008) 2.504
Norway 0.150 (0.117) 0.770 (0.070) 0.195 2.952 0.902 (0.009) 2.519
Poland 0.374 (0.044) 0.794 (0.026) 0.471 2.864 0.858 (0.009) 2.648
Portugal 0.471 (0.101) 0.808 (0.047) 0.583 2.813 0.855 (0.013) 2.659
Romania 0.394 (0.095) 0.777 (0.048) 0.507 2.925 0.850 (0.013) 2.673
Russian Federation 0.350 (0.067) 0.800 (0.028) 0.437 2.841 0.872 (0.007) 2.608
Slovakia 0.342 (0.097) 0.709 (0.049) 0.481 3.204 0.815 (0.013) 2.788
Slovenia 0.001 (0.027) 0.640 (0.037) 0.002 3.553 0.871 (0.015) 2.609
Spain 0.327 (0.058) 0.821 (0.030) 0.398 2.768 0.891 (0.008) 2.552
Sweden 0.374 (0.059) 0.786 (0.037) 0.475 2.891 0.855 (0.012) 2.658
Switzerland 0.267 (0.061) 0.865 (0.030) 0.309 2.628 0.929 (0.007) 2.446
Taiwan 0.354 (0.212) 0.783 (0.094) 0.453 2.903 0.872 (0.016) 2.608
Turkey 0.449 (0.080) 0.853 (0.033) 0.526 2.666 0.891 (0.011) 2.551
United Kingdom 0.204 (0.137) 0.905 (0.067) 0.226 2.511 0.961 (0.006) 2.366
United States of America 0.285 (0.120) 0.918 (0.052) 0.310 2.475 0.957 (0.009) 2.375
Rest of the World 0.335 (0.122) 0.932 (0.048) 0.359 2.438 0.959 (0.007) 2.369
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Table 3.7: Estimates of θsj , λ
s
j and k
s
j Using Firm-level Data, Manufacturing
Main Model Fixed Cost Model
Country θ̂sjλ
s
j θ̂
s
j λ̂
s
j k̂
s
j
(
θ̂sj
)fix (
k̂sj
)fix
Germany 0.051 (0.033) 0.619 (0.032) 0.082 6.225 0.837 (0.012) 4.607
Rest of the World 0.087 (0.072) 0.773 (0.062) 0.113 4.985 0.916 (0.015) 4.209
Table 3.8: Estimates of θsj , λ
s
j and k
s
j Using Firm-level Data, Other Sectors (n.c.e.)
Main Model Fixed Cost Model
Country θ̂sjλ
s
j θ̂
s
j λ̂
s
j k̂
s
j
(
θ̂sj
)fix (
k̂sj
)fix
Germany 0.199 (0.017) 0.726 (0.017) 0.274 9.156 0.857 (0.008) 7.761
Rest of the World 0.001 (0.013) 0.775 (0.036) 0.001 8.575 0.951 (0.003) 6.988
an interval from about the lower bound of the considered support to about 2.52 for exports of
Construction Services to Romania and 1.21 for exports of Transport Services to India.
Notice that a smaller value of ksj means that the density of small productivity levels of
firms is relatively lower compared to high productivity levels. The average implied value of k̂sj
across countries varies among the services sectors between 2.90 for Other Services and 7.86 for
Construction Services. Hence, extremely productive service producers emerge on average more
likely with Other Services than for Construction Services. The range of the estimates k̂sj across
countries is with [2.44, 3.74] relatively small for Other Services and with [3.6210.55] relatively
wide for ICT Services. This suggests that allowing for productivity distributions that differ
across targeted markets is important. When comparing the Melitz-Chaney-type model with the
one proposed here, two things stand out regarding k̂sj : First, the country-sector-specific point
estimates are smaller, on average; second, the range across targeted countries is considerably
more narrow for all sectors.
In Figure 3.1 we plot firms’ log sales over mean sales of Other Business Services to the United
Kingdom against the respective quantiles of the distribution as well the estimated theoretical
counterpart. We find that the model captures the sales of large and small firm sales very well,
though there is some overprediction of sales for firms between the first and seventh decile.10 We
contrast these findings with the estimates for the Melitz-Chaney-type of set-up. As Figure 3.1
shows, a model that does not allow for firm-specific market penetration is not able to explain
the cross-border activity of the majority of firms trading smaller volumes that we observe for
German services exporters.
10Results for other trading partners and service sectors are qualitatively very similar.
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Figure 3.1: Model Fit, Export Sales of Other Business Services to the United Kingdom
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Note: Due to the confidential nature of the data, each dot corresponds to the mean of three adjacent ranked sales.
Next, we compare the model fit across all trading partners by services sector. Figure 3.2
shows log sales over mean sales by the top and lower five percent of firms as well the median firms
plotted against log mean sales. Our model captures the cross-section of firms’ exports across all
traded volumes and service sectors quite well with the only two exceptions being the Transport
and Other Services sectors, where there is some overprediction for firms trading smaller volumes.
For manufactures in Table 3.7, the estimate of λ̂sj is with 0.082 within the range of estimates
with the services sectors (e.g., the estimate for Germany and Construction Services is 0.681 in
Table 3.3), and the one for the Rest of the World in Table 3.7 is with a value of 0.330 considerably
smaller than the one for Germany. The values of k̂sj for Germany and the Rest of the World in
Table 3.7 are estimated at 6.23 and 4.96, respectively. The value of k̂sj for Germany is relatively
high in comparison to the ones for the services sectors (except for Construction Services, where
it is 8.91), suggesting that high-productivity firms in German Manufactures for Germany are
relatively less frequent than the ones for services, except for Construction Services.
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Figure 3.2: Model Fit of German Services Exports by Sector
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3.4.3 Estimation and Decomposition of ζsij
In this subsection, we outline how ζsij , which encompasses the fixed component of the market
penetration cost function, fsij , and the iceberg-type trade cost parameter, τ
s
ij , is parameterized
and quantified. For this, consider the market share of aggregate services exports from country i
to country j in sector s, µsij , as given by equation (3.12). The parameters ζ
s
ij can be estimated as
the residuals from a log-linear regression of µsij on the following variables: an i-specific country
effect that reflects lnMi; an sj-specific effect that reflects the log-transformed denominator of
µsij ; k
s
j , whose si-specific parameter is ln b
s
i ; and 1− 1θsj − k
s
j whose si-specific parameter is ln c
s
i .
Clearly, this fixed-effects procedure obtains values of ln ζ̂sij which are centered around zero
in all sectors. However, the dispersion of ln ζ̂sij is not degenerate. We portray the distribution
of ln ζ̂sij across the five considered services sectors by way of histograms in Figure 3.3. The
standard deviation across country relationships ranges from 1.79 for Other Services to 2.15 for
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of ln ζ̂sij by Sector
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Construction Services. We exploit this dispersion to investigate the role of major factors of
influence behind ζsij such as geography or services trade policy in the following.
We use ln ζ̂sij and regress it on five candidate explanatory variables: a binary services-trade-
agreement indicator, STAij ;
11 log bilateral distance between the economic centers of two coun-
tries; a binary land contiguity indicator variable, an official common language indicator, and an
ethnic common language indicator. Let us collect these five regressors into the vector Zij , where
the first element is STAij .
Towards decomposing ζsij , we estimate a log-linear regression of the form
12
ln ζ̂sij = Zijβ
s,Z + us,Zij ,
where for inference one has to take into account that ζ̂sij is estimated (and “measured”) with
error. Then, the first element of the estimates β̂s,Z = [β̂s,STA, ...]′ is informative of the impact
11This indicator is unity for all country pairs which are members of a pure services-trade agreement or of a
general trade agreement with services-trade provisions according to information at the World Trade Organization.
12As the dependent variable of interest, ln ζ̂sij is already centered around zero, there is no need for including a
constant in the model.
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of STA provisions on ζ̂sij . As the latter is inversely related to obstacles to cross-border trade, we
would hypothesize that βs,STA > 0.
The parameters (and correctly size-adjusted standard errors) from the respective regression
for each sector are summarized in Table 3.9. The table suggests that membership in an STA
is relatively least important for Construction Services and relatively most important for Other
Business Services. The parameters on land-border contiguity and common ethnic language are
even bigger.13 The parameter on (log) distance is negative and relatively small in absolute
value.14
Table 3.9: Decomposing Log Scaled Inverse Trade and Market Access Costs Using Bilateral
Country-level Data
Services Trade
Agreement Distance Contiguity
Official
Language
Ethnic
LanguageSector
Transport 0.311 (0.032) -0.058 (0.002) 1.387 (0.049) -0.370 (0.047) 0.770 (0.062)
Construction Services 0.119 (0.023) -0.045 (0.002) 0.803 (0.068) -0.321 (0.102) 0.531 (0.136)
ICT Services 0.301 (0.038) -0.056 (0.003) 0.996 (0.023) 0.195 (0.036) 0.357 (0.036)
Other Business Services 0.323 (0.020) -0.055 (0.002) 0.910 (0.040) -0.014 (0.039) 0.303 (0.071)
Other Services 0.222 (0.038) -0.051 (0.003) 1.111 (0.049) 0.260 (0.063) 0.128 (0.077)
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 3.10: Impact of Services Trade Agreements on Log Scaled Inverse Trade and Market
Access Costs and Its Distance Equivalent
Percentage Change
Sector Decrease in ζsij Distance Equivalent
Transport -26.734 461.635
Construction Services -11.229 248.905
ICT Services -25.957 465.557
Other Business Services -27.573 501.632
Other Services -19.933 388.547
In Table 3.10 we convert the point estimates β̂s,STA > 0 into semi-elasticities in percent and
compute the distance equivalent in percent. The corresponding numbers suggest that the termi-
nation of the membership in an STA boosts overall scaled trade costs in a range of 11.23 percent
13The parameter on common official language is hard to interpret, since we always condition on ethnic language.
In every case where the official-common-language indicator is unity, the ethnic-common-language indicator is as
well.
14Relative to the literature on gravity models based on aggregate trade, in particular the coefficient on log
distance appears small, see the meta-study in Head and Mayer (2014). However, using less aggregated data tends
to result in lower point estimates in absolute value, see e.g. Crozet and Koenig (2010).
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(in Construction Services) and 27.57 percent (in Other Services). The distance equivalent to
exiting an STA membership corresponds to an increase in distance between 243.33 percent (in
Construction Services) and 487.97 percent (in Other Business Services) among STA partners.
3.5 General Equilibrium
In general equilibrium, factor prices respond endogenously to shocks in the economy. In order
to gauge the magnitude of the responses it is important to consider the well-documented input-
output structure of economies where services play a prominent role, see the WIOT.15 We follow
Caliendo and Parro (2015) in implementing this input-output structure based on the model of
Eaton and Kortum (2002).
3.5.1 The Structure of Production and Demand
In each country i and sector s there is a unit measure of perfectly competitive firms which
bundle a composite good that is a CES-basket of individual varieties belonging to sector s from
J countries:
Qsi =
{
J∑
j=1
∫ ∞
φs∗ji
[
qsji(v)
]σs−1
σs g(φsji)dφ
s
ji
} σs
σs−1
,
where qsji(v) is the quantity of output purchased from firm v located in country j.
16 Demand
for an individual variety of firm v which reaches a fraction of nsji(v) buyers in country i is given
by
qsji(v) = n
s
ji(v)
[
psji(v)
]−σs
(P si )
1−σs E
s
i ,
where total expenditure on varieties of sector s in country i correspond to Esi = P
s
i Q
s
i . P
s
i is
the sectoral price index,
P si =
{
J∑
j=1
M sji
∫ ∞
φs∗ji
nsji(v)
[
psji(v)
]1−σs
g(φsji)dφ
s
ji
} 1
1−σs
=
Θsi J∑
j=1
M sji
(
σs
σs − 1
csjτ
s
ji
φs∗ji
)1−σs 11−σs .
15World Input-Output Tables (WIOT).
16We think of the quantity of a service input to be a similar concept to labor and capital-services input in
manufacturing goods production. In that sense, the quantity of such an input is well defined. Consequently, the
price of a service input is the cost per efficiency unit of a purchased service.
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The composite good may be used for final consumption or as an input for other domestic firms.
To produce any output of services or goods, firms use labour and intermediates with a Cobb-
Douglas technology. To produce ysi (v) units, firm v in country i combines ℓ
s
i (v) units of labour
and intermediates of each sector z, qzsi (v),
ysi (v) = φ(v)
[
ℓsi (v)
γsi
]γsi S∏
z=1
[
qzsi (v)
γzsi
]γzsi
,
where γzsi is the input share of the composite intermediate goods or services inputs from sector
z in sector s and country i. The parameters γsi and
∑S
z=1 γ
zs
i = 1− γsi denote the value added
shares accruing to labour and intermediates, respectively.The cost per unit of ysi (v) is given by
csi = (w
s
i )
γsi
S∏
z=1
(P zi )
γzsi ,
where wsi are sector-specific wages. We assume that households’ upper-tier utility function is
Cobb-Douglas and of the form
U(Ci) =
S∏
s=1
(Csi )α
s
i ,
with aggregate consumption of output from sector s, Csi , and
∑S
s=1 α
s
i = 1. While P
s
i is the
ideal price index for sector-s consumption in country i, the ideal price index in that country for
consumption at large (across all sectors) is given by
Pi =
S∏
s=1
(
P si
αsi
)αsi
.
3.5.2 Labour Market Clearing and Trade Balance
Labour market clearing implies that the wage bill in country i for producing a variety of sector s
equals the labour earnings from production, γsi
∑J
j=1
σs−1
σs X
s
ij , plus labour earning from market
penetration, γsi
∑J
j=1
1−θsj
σs X
s
ij ,
wsiL
s
i = γ
s
i
J∑
j=1
(
σs − 1
σs
Xsij +
1− θsj
σs
Xsij
)
= γsi
J∑
j=1
σs − θsj
σs
Xsij . (3.18)
Aggregate expenditures in country i for goods or services of sector s are given by the sum
of firms’ spending on intermediates of sector s and a share αsi of households’ overall income,
which is given by the aggregate wage bill and dividends net of the share of the trade balance,
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net-exports Bi, that is spent on sector s-output, denoted by B
s
i . Hence, the trade balance is a
lump-sum transfer (possibly negative) to households. Sectoral expenditures are then given by
Esi =
J∑
j=1
Xsji = α
s
i
 S∑
z=1
wziL
z
i +
S∑
z=1
J∑
j=1
M zij p¯i
z
ij
−Bsi + S∑
z=1
γszi
J∑
j=1
σz − θzj
σz
Xzij . (3.19)
We assume that each country’s trade balance is a constant multiple of aggregate spending,
whereby Bsi = β
s
i
∑S
s=1E
s
i , to ensure that trade imbalances are scaled by a country’s economic
size. Using equations (3.11) and (3.18), (3.19) can be written as
Esi = α
s
i
 S∑
z=1
J∑
j=1
γzi σ
z + (1− γzi )θzj
σz
µsijE
z
j
− βsi S∑
z=1
Ezi +
S∑
z=1
γszi
J∑
j=1
σz − θzj
σz
µzijE
z
j ,(3.20)
where the market share of country i exporting varieties of sector s to country j, µsij , is given by
equation (3.12).
3.5.3 Changes in Endogenous Variables
For any generic variable h, h′ denotes its counterfactual value and h˙ denotes the ratio of coun-
terfactual and benchmark values with h˙ ≡ h′/h, with h′ = h˙h.
Using equation (3.12), the change in the market share of country i supplying varieties of
sector s in country j is given by
µ˙sij =
(c˙si )
1− 1
θs
j
−ksj
ζ˙sij∑J
l=1 µ
s
lj
(
c˙sl
)1− 1
θs
j
−ksj
ζ˙slj
.
Note that, given the exponents, µ˙sij depends on the endogenous c˙
s
i and the exogenous ζ˙
s
ji =(
τ˙ sij
)−ksij (
f˙ sij
)1− 1
θs
ij only. Using equation (3.20), changes in sectoral expenditures in country i
are given by
E˙siE
s
i = α
s
i
 S∑
z=1
J∑
j=1
γzi σ
z + (1− γzi )θzj
σz
µ˙zijE˙
z
j µ
z
ijE
z
j
− βsi S∑
z=1
E˙zi E
z
i
+
S∑
z=1
J∑
j=1
γszi
σz − θzj
σz
µ˙zijE˙
z
j µ
z
ijE
z
j .
Factor costs evolve according to
c˙si = (w˙
s
i )
γsi
S∏
z=1
(
P˙ zi
)γzsi
,
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with (
P˙ si
)1−σs
=
J∑
j=1
µsjiM˙
s
ji
(
c˙sj τ˙
s
ji
φ˙s∗ji
)1−σs
(3.21)
=
(
E˙si
)1−θsi J∑
j=1
µsji
(
µ˙sji
)1−θsi (c˙sj)θsi−(σs−1) (ζ˙sji)1−θsi . (3.22)
We assume that the measure of potential entrants in each country i,Mi, and its overall technol-
ogy level for providing varieties of different sectors to individual countries j, bsi , are invariant to
changes in trade costs. It then follows from equation (3.5) that changes in the measure of active
firms and the underlying cut-off efficiency levels are directly linked through φ˙s∗ij = (M˙
s
ij)
−1/ksj .
Apart from that, we have used that the change in overall exports of country i to market j of vari-
eties of sector s are given by X˙sij = µ˙
s
ijE˙
s
j = M˙
s
ij c˙
s
i f˙
s
ij , so that M˙
s
ij = µ˙
s
ijE˙
s
j/(c˙
s
i f˙
s
ij). Accordingly,
equation (3.21) can be expressed as equation (3.22).
We assume that labour is immobile across sectors and that the number of employees within
sectors is unaffected by trade liberalization. Then, w˙si can be derived from equation (3.18) as
w˙si =
γsi
wsiL
s
i
J∑
j=1
µ˙sijE˙
s
j
σs − θsj
σs
µsijE
s
j .
Using ηsij =
(σs−θsj)Xsij∑J
j=1(σs−θsj)Xsij
, the latter can be expressed as
w˙si =
J∑
j=1
ηsijµ˙
s
ijE˙
s
j .
Changes in nominal dividends are given by
Π˙si =
J∑
j=1
κsijµ˙
s
ijE˙
s
j ,
with κsij =
θsjX
s
ij∑J
j=1 θ
s
lX
s
ij
.
Upon a choice of a suitable set of S nume´raires, the system of equations in this subsection
can be solved uniquely for changes in the endogenous outcomes of interest in response to shocks
in, e.g., ζsij . For computational convenience, we choose the S values of E˙
s
i for the Rest of the
World as our nume´raires.
3.6 Quantitative Counterfactual Analysis of De-liberalizations
of Preferential Services-Market Access
We organise this section into two subsections, one is dedicated to the description of the coun-
terfactual experiments we undertake and the other one summarises the findings from these
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experiments.
3.6.1 Counterfactual Experiments
In the counterfactual analysis, we will consider three alternative types of experiments. In the first
one, we consider the case where one specific country at a time abandons all its existing services-
trade-agreement memberships (STAs) with all its trading partners in the data. There, for one
specific country that appears as an exporter, i, and as an importer j, in the data, we consider the
case where ζ˙sij = exp(−β̂s,STASTAij) if either i or j is that country (not when i = j). Clearly,
the associated effects should be expected to be bigger the more preferential trading partners they
have. However, the general equilibrium effects will also depend on technology, endowments, the
pattern of ζ˙sij as well as the input-output structure of the economies in the outset. In the second
experiment, we abandon all existing STAs jointly rather than removing them for individual
countries one at a time. Hence, we consider the case, where ζ˙sij = exp(−β̂s,STASTAij) for all
country pairs ij with i ̸= j. We expect the effects of this to be larger on average than the
ones with the first experiment. In the third experiment, we consider the case where ζ˙sij =
exp(−β̂s,STA) for all country pairs ij with i ̸= j, irrespective of whether they have preferential
services trade provisions in place or not. Hence, in comparison to the second experiment, the
binary indicator variable STAij is absent in the exponent ζ˙
s
ij = exp(·). This serves to gauge
insights into the quantitative impact of an increase in services trade costs to an extent that
corresponds to the one of abandoning an existing STA (no matter whether an STA is in place or
not). Clearly, as the latter experiment is of a non-discriminatory nature (among foreign trade
partners), the associated effects should be largest in comparison to the other experiments.
As for the consequences of the aforementioned types of changes for real economic outcomes,
we will consider responses in real consumption for the representative household (a utilitarian
measure of welfare in this model), Ui, as well as sector-specific changes in real wages (w
s
i /P
s
i ) and
dividends (
∑J
j=1M
s
ij p¯i
s
ij/P
s
i ) which, apart from changes in real trade imbalances, real changes
in household consumption depend upon.17
3.6.2 Abandoning Services-trade-agreement Membership (STA) for Selected
Individual Countries
When quantifying the effects of an exit from existing STAs for individual countries, we focus on
the following economies: Austria (small, centrally located, and many STA partners); Belgium
(small, centrally located, many STA partners); Canada (small, peripherally located, and few
17Notice that both real wages and real dividends depend on the nominal sales of firms in a country and sector
so that the effects on these aggregates are not independent of each other.
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STA partners); France (large, centrally located, and many STA partners); Germany (large,
centrally located, and many STA partners); Netherlands (small, centrally located, and many
STA partners); United Kingdom (large, centrally located, and many STA partners); United
States (large, peripherally located, and few STA partners). Table 3.11 reports the rank in terms
of the number of STA memberships, the average distance to destination countries as well as
total services expenditures among the considered countries.
Table 3.11: Rank of Considered Countries in Terms of Number of STA Members, Average
Distance to Trading Partners and Total Services Expenditures
Country STA Members Average Distance Services Spending
Austria 1 8 8
Belgium 1 6 7
Canada 5 1 5
France 1 4 4
Germany 1 7 2
Netherlands 1 5 6
United Kingdom 1 3 3
United States of America 6 2 1
Since all countries are connected through trade in this model, there are effects on third
countries from abandoning STA membership in a single economy at a time. The magnitude
of effects on the respective economies and on third countries depends on the “connectedness”
of the countries in the international WIOT network. In order to capture the heterogeneity of
effects, we report one table for each STA-abandoning country and, within a table, moments of
the distribution of effects across partner countries (some of which are STA members with the
respective country and some of which are not).18 In each table, we summarizes the effects on
real consumption across all sectors, on the real wages across sectors, and on the real dividends
across sectors. The effects across sectors depend on the importance of STA membership for ζ̂sij ,
i.e., on β̂s,STA, as well as on the input-output linkages between sectors, which are specific to an
economy. All effects are expressed in percent and summarized in Tables 3.12 to 3.19.
In a nutshell, three key findings from this analysis stand out. First, exiting STAs is costly
in terms of real household consumption, and the costs tend to be higher for smaller countries
than larger ones as well as for well connected countries (more STA partners in the outset; more
central countries) than for less well connected ones (fewer STA partners in the outset; more
peripheral countries).
Second, the effects on third countries are largely heterogeneous and may be even bigger at
18Specifically, we report on the minimum (min), the 10th 50th, and 90th percentile (p10, p50, p90), and the
maximum effect across third countries.
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Table 3.12: Removal of Preferential Market Access for Services, Austria
Impact on
Austria
Impact on Other Countries
Change in min p10 p50 p90 max
Real Consumption
All Sectors -0.504 -0.300 -0.058 -0.005 0.000 0.001
Real Wages
Transport -2.117 -0.744 -0.300 -0.006 0.004 0.014
Construction -0.247 -0.167 -0.044 -0.003 0.000 0.000
ICT Services -1.706 -0.154 -0.117 -0.006 0.001 0.003
Other Business Services -0.936 -0.436 -0.087 -0.008 0.000 0.001
Other Services -0.510 -0.397 -0.063 -0.004 0.000 0.000
Manufacturing -0.247 -0.081 -0.016 -0.001 0.000 0.011
Other Sectors (n.c.e) -0.244 -0.103 -0.019 -0.001 0.000 0.005
Real Dividends
Transport -2.533 -0.575 -0.233 -0.007 0.003 0.011
Construction -0.248 -0.165 -0.043 -0.003 0.000 0.061
ICT Services -2.797 -0.143 -0.063 -0.002 0.001 0.003
Other Business Services -1.034 -0.469 -0.091 -0.007 0.000 0.001
Other Services -0.491 -0.412 -0.078 -0.005 0.000 0.000
Manufacturing -0.248 -0.080 -0.016 -0.001 0.001 0.010
Other Sectors (n.c.e) -0.244 -0.102 -0.018 -0.001 0.001 0.006
Table 3.13: Removal of Preferential Market Access for Services, Belgium
Impact on
Belgium
Impact on Other Countries
Change in min p10 p50 p90 max
Real Consumption
All Sectors -0.902 -0.602 -0.042 -0.015 0.000 0.001
Real Wages
Transport -2.467 -0.447 -0.200 -0.032 0.006 0.018
Construction -0.572 -0.260 -0.051 -0.008 0.000 0.000
ICT Services -2.083 -1.450 -0.076 -0.018 0.001 0.001
Other Business Services -1.957 -0.463 -0.139 -0.028 0.002 0.006
Other Services -0.925 -0.813 -0.047 -0.015 0.000 0.000
Manufacturing -0.555 -0.189 -0.029 -0.005 0.002 0.005
Other Sectors (n.c.e) -0.432 -0.198 -0.025 -0.004 0.000 0.009
Real Dividends
Transport -2.722 -0.372 -0.144 -0.027 0.005 0.018
Construction -0.690 -0.248 -0.045 -0.006 0.000 0.022
ICT Services -2.822 -1.215 -0.067 -0.016 0.002 0.009
Other Business Services -1.395 -0.555 -0.230 -0.056 0.002 0.005
Other Services -0.928 -0.788 -0.061 -0.016 0.000 0.000
Manufacturing -0.557 -0.190 -0.029 -0.006 0.002 0.005
Other Sectors (n.c.e) -0.432 -0.196 -0.025 -0.004 0.000 0.009
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Table 3.14: Removal of Preferential Market Access for Services, Canada
Impact on
Canada
Impact on Other Countries
Change in min p10 p50 p90 max
Real Consumption
All Sectors -0.115 -0.010 -0.003 0.000 0.001 0.001
Real Wages
Transport -0.223 -0.053 0.000 0.003 0.006 0.012
Construction -0.106 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001
ICT Services -0.174 -0.018 -0.003 0.000 0.001 0.008
Other Business Services -0.338 -0.026 -0.003 0.000 0.001 0.003
Other Services -0.144 -0.013 -0.003 0.000 0.000 0.001
Manufacturing -0.071 -0.011 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Other Sectors (n.c.e) -0.054 -0.007 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Real Dividends
Transport -0.189 -0.058 0.000 0.004 0.008 0.014
Construction -0.114 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001
ICT Services -0.405 -0.005 -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.020
Other Business Services -0.637 -0.028 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
Other Services -0.164 -0.014 -0.003 0.000 0.000 0.001
Manufacturing -0.071 -0.011 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Other Sectors (n.c.e) -0.054 -0.007 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 3.15: Removal of Preferential Market Access for Services, France
Impact on
France
Impact on Other Countries
Change in min p10 p50 p90 max
Real Consumption
All Sectors -0.257 -0.651 -0.071 -0.018 0.000 0.001
Real Wages
Transport -1.234 -0.673 -0.314 -0.034 0.012 0.032
Construction -0.135 -0.396 -0.093 -0.015 0.000 0.000
ICT Services -0.432 -1.062 -0.119 -0.028 0.001 0.006
Other Business Services -0.779 -0.673 -0.204 -0.022 0.004 0.010
Other Services -0.210 -0.839 -0.055 -0.019 0.000 0.000
Manufacturing -0.158 -0.185 -0.066 -0.006 0.000 0.008
Other Sectors (n.c.e) -0.141 -0.241 -0.058 -0.006 0.000 0.012
Real Dividends
Transport -1.651 -0.420 -0.206 -0.021 0.016 0.038
Construction -0.135 -0.436 -0.094 -0.015 0.000 0.016
ICT Services -0.409 -1.109 -0.125 -0.032 0.002 0.007
Other Business Services -0.862 -0.631 -0.190 -0.028 0.004 0.016
Other Services -0.206 -0.838 -0.053 -0.021 0.000 0.000
Manufacturing -0.158 -0.185 -0.065 -0.006 0.001 0.009
Other Sectors (n.c.e) -0.141 -0.239 -0.058 -0.005 0.000 0.013
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Table 3.16: Removal of Preferential Market Access for Services, Germany
Impact on
Germany
Impact on Other Countries
Change in min p10 p50 p90 max
Real Consumption
All Sectors -0.309 -0.784 -0.131 -0.032 0.000 0.001
Real Wages
Transport -0.742 -0.685 -0.373 -0.036 0.012 0.034
Construction -0.112 -0.420 -0.100 -0.020 0.000 0.001
ICT Services -0.978 -2.086 -0.381 -0.048 0.003 0.021
Other Business Services -0.735 -1.038 -0.318 -0.049 0.001 0.013
Other Services -0.339 -0.871 -0.143 -0.033 0.000 0.001
Manufacturing -0.229 -0.242 -0.061 -0.011 0.003 0.037
Other Sectors (n.c.e) -0.192 -0.249 -0.054 -0.008 0.000 0.031
Real Dividends
Transport -0.581 -0.887 -0.422 -0.050 0.011 0.042
Construction -0.124 -0.373 -0.104 -0.017 0.000 0.020
ICT Services -1.051 -1.994 -0.276 -0.043 0.006 0.026
Other Business Services -1.192 -0.653 -0.247 -0.032 0.003 0.053
Other Services -0.435 -0.719 -0.121 -0.026 0.000 0.009
Manufacturing -0.227 -0.241 -0.060 -0.011 0.003 0.039
Other Sectors (n.c.e) -0.192 -0.246 -0.054 -0.008 0.001 0.031
Table 3.17: Removal of Preferential Market Access for Services, Netherlands
Impact on the
Netherlands
Impact on Other Countries
Change in min p10 p50 p90 max
Real Consumption
All Sectors -0.708 -0.464 -0.061 -0.013 0.000 0.001
Real Wages
Transport -3.394 -0.362 -0.259 0.000 0.014 0.047
Construction -0.913 -0.230 -0.051 -0.008 0.000 0.014
ICT Services -1.253 -0.729 -0.182 -0.022 0.002 0.005
Other Business Services -2.246 -0.722 -0.211 -0.018 0.002 0.006
Other Services -0.501 -0.614 -0.066 -0.012 0.000 0.001
Manufacturing -0.131 -0.228 -0.065 -0.016 0.001 0.004
Other Sectors (n.c.e) -0.109 -0.186 -0.043 -0.011 0.000 0.002
Real Dividends
Transport -3.292 -0.412 -0.214 -0.003 0.011 0.027
Construction -0.984 -0.215 -0.053 -0.007 0.000 0.013
ICT Services -1.537 -0.696 -0.177 -0.021 0.005 0.014
Other Business Services -1.678 -0.881 -0.241 -0.042 0.002 0.005
Other Services -0.471 -0.721 -0.072 -0.016 0.000 0.001
Manufacturing -0.133 -0.229 -0.066 -0.016 0.001 0.004
Other Sectors (n.c.e) -0.110 -0.186 -0.042 -0.011 0.000 0.002
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Table 3.18: Removal of Preferential Market Access for Services, United Kingdom
Impact on the
United Kingdom
Impact on Other Countries
Change in min p10 p50 p90 max
Real Consumption
All Sectors -0.343 -3.128 -0.138 -0.033 0.000 0.001
Real Wages
Transport -0.263 -2.225 -0.467 -0.077 0.007 0.042
Construction -0.170 -1.613 -0.118 -0.026 0.000 0.003
ICT Services -0.741 -3.183 -0.273 -0.054 0.003 0.007
Other Business Services -0.953 -2.267 -0.228 -0.060 0.003 0.012
Other Services -0.406 -4.054 -0.153 -0.034 0.001 0.002
Manufacturing -0.084 -0.912 -0.075 -0.017 -0.001 0.029
Other Sectors (n.c.e) -0.121 -1.388 -0.070 -0.014 0.000 0.024
Real Dividends
Transport -0.641 -1.929 -0.366 -0.037 0.005 0.047
Construction -0.170 -1.595 -0.129 -0.024 0.001 0.095
ICT Services -0.466 -3.279 -0.425 -0.100 0.005 0.018
Other Business Services -0.730 -2.369 -0.399 -0.089 0.005 0.009
Other Services -0.355 -5.037 -0.281 -0.039 0.001 0.003
Manufacturing -0.082 -0.897 -0.075 -0.017 -0.001 0.028
Other Sectors (n.c.e) -0.121 -1.385 -0.069 -0.014 0.000 0.024
Table 3.19: Removal of Preferential Market Access for Services, United States of America
Impact on
the USA
Impact on Other Countries
Change in min p10 p50 p90 max
Real Consumption
All Sectors -0.018 -0.104 -0.017 0.000 0.002 0.021
Real Wages
Transport -0.145 -0.140 -0.024 0.007 0.015 0.028
Construction -0.011 -0.098 -0.002 0.001 0.004 0.009
ICT Services -0.047 -0.143 -0.006 0.002 0.004 0.038
Other Business Services -0.053 -0.319 -0.012 0.001 0.003 0.013
Other Services -0.026 -0.131 -0.016 0.001 0.002 0.029
Manufacturing -0.008 -0.073 -0.009 -0.001 0.000 0.004
Other Sectors (n.c.e) -0.007 -0.057 -0.005 -0.001 0.000 0.004
Real Dividends
Transport -0.146 -0.161 -0.022 0.010 0.019 0.033
Construction -0.011 -0.106 -0.005 0.001 0.004 0.008
ICT Services -0.023 -0.312 -0.007 0.003 0.005 0.035
Other Business Services -0.014 -0.601 -0.018 0.001 0.003 0.010
Other Services -0.025 -0.150 -0.016 0.001 0.003 0.032
Manufacturing -0.008 -0.073 -0.009 -0.001 0.000 0.004
Other Sectors (n.c.e) -0.007 -0.057 -0.005 -0.001 0.000 0.004
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the extremes in absolute value than for the exiting country at stake in a table. The latter is
more likely the case for larger and less peripheral exiting countries with more STA partners in
the outset (see the lower-bound effect on third countries for Germany or United Kingdom and
compare it with those of other countries). Due to a redirection (“diversion”) of trade through
STA memberships, some third countries will benefit from removing STAs, but these effects tend
to be relatively small in magnitude.
Third, the magnitude of the effects on real wages and real dividends across sectors is relatively
similar on average, but there is a large degree of heterogeneity of the effects on these outcomes
across sectors. Accruing to the relatively large absolute value of β̂s,STA for Other Business
Services in Table 3.9, the effect is largest on average for these outcomes in this sector. The
largest effects in percent are found for Belgium and the Netherlands, and the smallest ones are
found for the United States. However, the degree of variation of the effects across sectors (and
third countries) depends on the input-output structure of an economy. While the effects on real
wages and dividends are negative on exiting countries across all services sectors, there are also
sizable negative effects on these outcomes in Manufacturing, even though there are no direct
effects on that sector from exiting an STA.19
3.6.3 Abandoning Services-trade-agreement Membership (STA) for All Coun-
tries Jointly
While the analysis in the previous subsection was devoted to a removal of preferential market
access between a single country and its trading partners as of 2014, we quantify effects of a
joint de-liberalization among all preferential trading partners in this subsection. To put the two
types of experiments in perspective, notice that preferential market access entails some diversion
of business transactions from countries that have a comparative advantage in doing something
before trade policy due to the distortions introduced by such policy. However, this diversion is
of greater importance, if preferential market access is more selective and, hence, covers fewer
economies and a smaller share of the world market. De-liberalizing preferential market access for
a single economy and its trading partners entails a change in market access only for a relatively
limited number of trading partners in the world trade matrix. Consequently, the effects should
be relatively smaller than with a de-liberalization of preferential market access for all economies
jointly.
Table 3.20 summarizes the findings for this experiment, giving moments for all countries, and
Table 3.21 does so for real consumption in the selected countries as considered in the previous
19Notice that we choose the design of the experiment such that countries only change preferential market access
to services but not goods in the counterfactual analysis.
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Table 3.20: Removal of Services Trade Agreement Membership For All Countries Jointly
Impact on All Countries
Change in min p10 p50 p90 max
Real Consumption
All Sectors -8.165 -0.924 -0.357 -0.014 0.000
Real Wages
Transport -6.031 -3.639 -1.072 0.004 0.118
Construction -4.682 -0.860 -0.214 -0.002 0.003
ICT Services -13.620 -1.801 -0.721 0.006 0.018
Other Business Services -7.883 -2.169 -0.774 -0.017 0.002
Other Services -10.564 -1.079 -0.342 -0.007 0.000
Manufacturing -2.456 -0.381 -0.162 -0.007 0.039
Other Sectors (n.c.e) -3.253 -0.371 -0.141 -0.001 0.033
Real Dividends
Transport -6.608 -3.758 -1.191 0.002 0.124
Construction -4.545 -0.862 -0.199 -0.002 0.196
ICT Services -13.339 -2.586 -0.907 0.005 0.064
Other Business Services -9.222 -2.599 -0.966 -0.008 0.002
Other Services -11.557 -1.485 -0.363 -0.007 -0.001
Manufacturing -2.464 -0.382 -0.159 -0.007 0.043
Other Sectors (n.c.e) -3.227 -0.370 -0.141 -0.001 0.038
Table 3.21: Impact of the Removal of All Services Trade Agreement Membership on Real
Consumption in Selected Countries
Country All Sectors
Austria -0.489
Belgium -0.892
Canada -0.112
France -0.253
Germany -0.307
Netherlands -0.694
United Kingdom -0.338
United States of America -0.016
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subsection. These two tables confirm exactly the above argument: for each and every country are
the effects on economic outcomes bigger with a world-wide joint de-liberalization than with an
individual one (for this, compare the top row of Table 3.12 to Table 3.19 with the corresponding
cells in Table 3.21), and particularly so for small and less remote countries which extensively
used preferential trade agreements ex ante in 2014.
Table 3.21 suggests that the effects of the considered type of de-liberalization on real con-
sumption range from -0.02 percent to -0.49 percent for the countries at hand. These are static
(one-shot, overall) responses in the present model. Relative to the rates of annual growth of
real GDP of the covered economies, we might say that they correspond to a year’s real income
growth in the post-Economic-and-Financial-Crisis era. Hence, the effects of a de-liberalization of
preferential market access in services only are not trivially small, and they spill over to economies
which do not change their behavior (as they did not operate under preferential services market
access in 2014) and to sectors such as manufacturing for which we keep the policy environment
constant. Whether and to which extent workers and shareholders in manufacturing would be
hurt by the considered de-liberalization depends on the ramifications established through the
industrial input-output structure of an economy, but on average they would suffer a loss from
higher services input costs.
3.6.4 Raising Services Trade Costs Everywhere to an Extent as if a Global
Services Trade Agreement (STA) Was Abandoned
The experiments in the two previous subsections pertained to some discriminatory change –
abandoning all preferential STAs of a single country versus abandoning all STAs globally. In this
subsection, we envisage a non-discriminatory global increase in services trade costs. However, in
order to link the results to the earlier discussion, we consider an increase in services trade costs
which is equivalent to a removal of a global STA, where all countries hypothetically participate
as of 2014. Accordingly, there is no diversion present with this experiment (except for diverting
trade towards domestic sales). Accordingly, the associated effects should be even bigger on
average as with the second experiment.
Tables 3.22 and 3.23 summarize the corresponding findings in a way akin to the previous
subsection. It is apparent from a comparison of Table 3.22 with Table 3.20 and of Table 3.23
with Table 3.21 that the economic costs of such an increase in non-tariff barriers to services
trade are even bigger than for a global removal of preferential market access in services. Again,
the patterns across countries and sectors are similar as with the second experiment, though.
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Table 3.22: Global Removal of Services Trade Agreement Membership
Impact on All Countries
Change in min p10 p50 p90 max
Real Consumption
All Sectors -12.544 -1.497 -0.605 -0.147 -0.078
Real Wages
Transport -7.910 -6.693 -2.026 -0.349 -0.033
Construction -6.929 -1.298 -0.398 -0.076 -0.019
ICT Services -17.979 -2.761 -1.255 -0.205 -0.023
Other Business Services -10.267 -3.019 -1.153 -0.321 -0.060
Other Services -16.423 -1.437 -0.584 -0.131 -0.086
Manufacturing -3.647 -0.655 -0.248 -0.047 0.115
Other Sectors (n.c.e) -4.806 -0.625 -0.218 -0.004 0.037
Real Dividends
Transport -8.743 -7.225 -2.398 -0.279 -0.064
Construction -6.788 -1.321 -0.407 -0.078 -0.019
ICT Services -17.994 -3.781 -1.733 -0.233 -0.039
Other Business Services -10.394 -3.941 -1.479 -0.288 -0.063
Other Services -16.605 -2.067 -0.718 -0.137 -0.091
Manufacturing -3.653 -0.647 -0.242 -0.044 0.130
Other Sectors (n.c.e) -4.764 -0.623 -0.218 -0.003 0.043
Table 3.23: Impact of the Global Removal of Services Trade Agreement Membership on Real
Consumption in Selected Countries
Country All Sectors
Austria -0.649
Belgium -1.392
Canada -0.308
France -0.409
Germany -0.488
Netherlands -1.181
United Kingdom -0.592
United States of America -0.103
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3.7 Conclusion
This paper provides a quantitative analysis of a multi-sector model of trade with an imperfect
coverage of customers by suppliers as in Arkolakis (2010) with a special focus on services rather
than goods. The structural model is informed by aggregate sector-level for multiple countries
as well micro transaction-level as well as firm-level data for Germany.
The wealth of data available permits an identification of all fundamental model parameters
and alludes to the variation of these parameters across sectors and, where applicable, across
consumer countries. The parameter estimates support an apparently good model fit of the
relevant moments of the data for the present purpose.
The estimates are then used to inform a quantitative counterfactual analysis towards as-
sessing the relevance of economic policy. In that regard, we allude to the role of services trade
agreements (STAs) as an instrument which affects the conglomerate of variable and fixed costs
of cross-border services transactions. Towards an assessment of the quantitative effects of STA
membership on economies through activity in services sectors, we proceed in two steps.
First, we establish a link between estimated overall (variable and fixed) transaction costs
in services and find that STAs have a similar quantitative partial (direct) impact on them on
average across the considered services sectors as a goods-trade-agreement membership has on
trade in manufactures with the data at hand.
Second, we use the estimated increases of partial overall trade costs and quantify their impact
on various economic aggregates (such as real consumption, real wages, and real dividends) across
countries from individually versus jointly exiting existing STAs as of 2011. The findings suggest,
as expected, that (i) smaller and less remote countries suffer bigger losses which range from about
-11.3 percent to about -0.3 percent in the case of a world-wide exit from all STAs; (ii) there are
non-trivial detrimental spillover effects to the manufacturing sector from abandoning services-
trade provisions in trade agreements on average, depending on the input-output relationships
in a country; (iii) there are effects on partner countries and third countries that may be larger
than for large STA-abandoning economies; (iv) effects on real wages and on real dividends are
of a similar magnitude.
We hope that these results help for a better understanding of the quantitative importance
of services and of economic policy addressing them. Due to recent political developments in
Europe and elsewhere, preferential market access of business transactions in trade agreements –
not only in goods but also in services – is at risk. The present paper suggests that preferential
services provisions alone in such agreements are relatively important. For example, for the
United Kingdom, abandoning existing provisions for services in trade agreements as of 2011
would involve a loss of real consumption per capita of about 0.6 percentage points – a magnitude
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that is in the ballpark of a year’s worth of growth of the real economy in Europe since after the
Economic and Financial Crisis.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
Services Categories
According to the IMF’s BPM6 Compilation Guide (2014) services trade can be decomposed
into:
• Manufacturing Services on Physical Inputs Owned by Others (formely goods trade)
• Transport Services
• Travel
• Other Services:
– Maintenance and Repair Services
– Construction
– Insurance Services
– Financial Services
– Charges for the Use of Intellectual Property
– Telecommunication, Computer and Information Services, ICT
– Other Business Services:
∗ Research and Development
∗ Professional and Management Services
∗ Technical, Trade-related and Other Business Services
∗ Operating Leasing
– Personal, Cultural and Recreational Services, Audiovisual Services; Other Personal,
Culural, and Recreational Services
– Government Goods and Services n.i.e.
We stick to this scheme with a few exceptions: First, we add Maintenance and Repair Services
as well as Travel to the group of Other Services given that the sectoral counterpart in firm-
level data and the WIOD is not clear. Second, given the sectoral breakdown in the WIOD, we
further extract Construction, Other Business Services and Telecommunication, Computer and
Information Services from the group of Other Services. Third, we add Manufacturing Services
on Physical Inputs Owned by Others given that we cannot separate manufacturing services from
other manufacturing activities and this item apparently is most closely related to Other Business
Services.
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